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Abstrakt: 
This thesis analyzes ways in which distinctions such as the human/animal and the human/non-
human are theorized and understood in post-humanist feminist scholarship. Post-humanist 
criticisms of the dichotomy of the human/animal and anthropocentric discourses in general are 
often articulated as a question of politics and knowledge production, and as a critique of the 
Western history of ideas. The political concerns articulated in this critique are important and 
need to be recognized. However, this thesis focuses on how debates around concepts and 
distinctions such as the human/animal and the human/non-human express certain 
epistemological commitments and preconceived notions (for example, about language and 
ethics) that are not always explicitly acknowledged or formulated. This thesis aims to describe 
these presuppositions, by applying Ludwig Wittgenstein’s description of “pictures holding us 
captive” in order to show how these presuppositions or “pictures” influence the ways in which 
questions of language, ethics, philosophy and criticism are thought of within feminist post-
humanist theory. The thesis also suggests that ordinary language philosophy and the descriptive 
“method” of Wittgenstein, or rather, his suggestion that philosophy should be descriptive, can 
clarify some of the issues debated, and provide an alternative to and a deeper understanding of 
the questions and concerns that are central to feminist post-humanist discussions. 
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Post-humanist and feminist theories share the critique of man as ‘measure of all 
things’, and a critical stance towards the philosophical tradition, in particular, 
concerning its racist and sexist ideas, its notions of human exceptionaalism and 
anthropocentrism1. By emphasizing political aspects of the common-sense orderings 
of the world and the different ways in which ideas of the human and the non-human 
are circulated in our culture, practices of inclusion and exclusion, dehumanization 
and objectification are brought to the forefront (Chen 2012). The ways in which 
categories gain their meaning based on differences as not only exclusionary and 
mutually exclusive (man/woman, nature/culture and so on), but also as existing in a 
hierarchical relationship, are analyzed as part of a specific historical narrative that 
has formed culturally specific forms of self-understanding. A central idea in post-
humanist criticisms of the sciences and our culture more broadly, is that power and 
knowledge saturates everyday language and everyday practices and experiences that 
uphold different notions of otherness, mirroring historically constructed ideas. Post-
humanist approaches further question the implicit and explicit hierarchies of the 
philosophical tradition, such as human/animal, rational/emotional, nature/culture, 
man/woman, subject/object by offering alternative ways of thinking about these 
categories and concepts (MacCormack 2012, Braidotti 2013). 
 
Against this background, post-humanist and feminist thinkers have emphasized the 
necessity of paying attention to the ways in which we need to rethink the notions of 
nature and culture, the human and the animal and other distinctions that have had a 
crucial but problematic role in the history of modern philosophy (Haraway 1994, 
Barad 2003, MacCormcak 2012, Braidotti 2013). A central feature in discussions of 
posthumanism is the idea of the human as being defined through different 
                                                
1 I am not claiming that all scholarship that falls under the description of feminist or post-humanist 
theory considers discussions of race or philosophy inherently anthropocentric, but this is generally 
how critique against the philosophical tradition in feminist and post-humanist scholarship is presented 
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exclusionary practices, linguistic and material, or material-discursive as Karen Barad 
expresses it, and that these are expressions of hierarchical power relations 2 . 
Responding to the challenge that this power analysis confronts us with, namely how 
to speak, act and think beyond a reiterative dialectic of hierarchies and differences, 
Deleuzian feminists like Rosi Braidotti and Patricia MacCormack have suggested 
that we need to approach all living matter on the same level. A way of challenging 
the habit of thinking in terms of dichotomies and hierarchies is then to adopt a 
perspective where all living and non-living, the human and the non-human, subject 
and object are approached (epistemologically) on the same ontological level. This 
perspective articulates a kind of flat ontology that is introduced as a perspective to 
adopt in avoiding the problematic metaphors of the philosophical tradition. Another 
key idea in Deleuzian feminism is to invent new concepts, in order to avoid the old 
and problematic ones (Grosz 2010, MacCormack 2012, Braidotti 2013).  
 
The human and the non-human, thus, are contested terms within the traditions of 
critical theory and philosophy, particularly within feminist and post-humanist 
frameworks. The emphasis on the human as a contested category relies heavily on 
critiques of the enlightenment subject, and its historical emergence as a part of a 
larger narrative of racial difference. There is also, however, philosophical 
scholarship in which the human (and recently also the non-human), human practices, 
language and life forms have become central to the field’s understanding of 
philosophy and philosophical activity. I am here thinking about the traditions of 
post-structuralism and continental philosophy on the one hand, and Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language and moral philosophy on the other. In both traditions, the 
concepts of the human and the non-human play a central role relating to moral, 
philosophical and political questions. Although these traditions are often understood 
and described as mutually opposite and exclusive, (post-structuralism being defined 
as explicitly political, critical philosophy, and Wittgensteinian scholarship as 
                                                
2 Barad’s concept of the material – discursive is an attempt to move beyond the linguistic paradigm 
and the emphasis in meaning as linguistically performative that dominated the field of feminist and 
gender studies over the last decades. By introducing the concept of post-humanist performativity 
Barad wants to bring in materiality and matter as key concepts in feminist theorizing (Barad 2003).  
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unpolitical, uncritical philosophy), they share an interest in language, the human, 
critique, morality and ethics3.  
2-3'
 
In this thesis, my aim is to discuss the ways in which feminist post-humanist and 
Wittgensteinian inspired scholarship understands and envisions questions relating to 
language, power, critique, meaning, the human, and ethics. I examine some of the 
ideas regarding exclusionary practices, flat ontology, and the need to rethink our 
notions and concepts of the human and the non-human. I ask how central thinkers 
within feminist and post-humanist theory articulate these ideas as ways of thinking 
critically about the human and the non-human. To this end, I develop a close reading 
of four texts:  
 
1) Judith Butler’s introduction to her book Undoing Gender (2004) in which she 
elaborates on how “the norms that confer “humanness” on some individuals” 
rather than others, produces “a differential between the human and the less-
than-human” (Butler 2004: 2). 
 
2)  Karen Barad’s article “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an 
Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” (2003), in which she 
develops Butler’s concept of performativity in a post-humanist framework. 
 
3) Mel Y. Chen’s chapter: “Language and Mattering Humans” in the book 
Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering and Queer Affect (2012) in which 
Chen argues that an animacy hierarchy saturates our culture. 
 
                                                
3 Both ethics and morality are terms used within Wittgensteinian scholarship, whereas post-humanist 
and feminist thinkers mostly use the term ethics to refer to moral and ethical questions. Despite a 
commonly held view that there is a distinction between the concepts (for instance that morality 
concerns customs and ‘norms’ within a society and ethics is the intellectual deliberation concerning 
these ‘norms’), I do not assume this kind of distinction, nor do I subscribe to a specific understanding 
of either concept. I use them interchangeably to refer to what I call ethical or moral questions, often as 
a way of underlining a distinction between an epistemological and a moral - existential perspective.  
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4)  Patricia MacCormack’s chapter “Animalities: Ethics and Absolute 
Abolition” from her book Posthumanist Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural 
Theory (2012), in which MacCormack elaborates on an abolitionist position 
towards our relations to animals. 
 
My aim is not to provide an overview of the thought of these scholars, but to 
highlight a few aspects of their work in an attempt to contextualize feminist criticism 
and address some of its contemporary forms. Despite the obvious differences in 
philosophical style, voice and scholarly backgrounds of the authors that I discuss, 
there are also striking similarities in the way these authors understand language and 
meaning as a question of power, difference, hierarchy and exclusion. These thinkers 
are all strongly influenced by the tradition of post-structuralist feminist theorizing 
and continental philosophy, in emphasizing power, normativity and exclusion, and in 
theorizing the role that difference plays in making ‘the human’ intelligible4. I discuss 
these writers in order to make visible shared ideas or pictures (in the Wittgensteinian 
sense) that I see as common in the field of post-humanist and feminist critique. 
These ideas often function as presuppositions and unnoticed ways of thinking, or 
theoretical outlooks – one could describe them as certain kinds of “epistemic habits” 
of critique. By turning to Wittgensteinian language and moral philosophy, I aim to 
challenge some of these pictures that I describe as “epistemic habits”, and illuminate 
the ways in which these pictures and habits can be dissolved through Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical “method”5. 
                                                
4 Although they can be situated as representative of particular fields, new materialist (Barad), 
Deleuzian (MacCormack), queer-theoretical (Butler) and interdisciplinary post-humanist gender 
studies (Chen) these labels overlap and the aim is not to situate either one of them in a specific kind of 
scholarship, but to pay attention to their ways of thinking, patterns of thought, ideas and arguments. 
These are ideas and pictures, ways of understanding that are of interest in themselves regardless of 
who authored or articulated them. This means I could have easily chosen other writers and examples 
concerning these topics. I have chosen these examples primarily to illuminate and to enter into a 
dialogue with certain ways of thinking, not to discuss a specific theorist, theoretical tradition or 
philosopher. 
5 Whether one can speak of a ‘Wittgensteinian method or method’s is a debated question and a 
detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this article. For an overview of the different 
positions and the debate see (Vyss 2015, Conant, Baker 2004, see also Backström 2015, Conant 2015 
and McGuinn 2015). In section I, I explicate what I mean by Wittgenstein’s suggestion that 
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One “epistemic habit” is the idea, inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure that words and 
concepts gain their meaning through their opposites, and the ways in which they 
come to signify is thus dependent on a hierarchy and on difference. The human is 
dependent on the meanings of the non-human, what is seen as natural is defined in 
relation to the unnatural, and so on. This is an understanding of language and 
meaning that post-structuralist writers reject, questioning language as having a fixed 
structure in the way Saussure understands it (Saussure 2011, Moi 2017). However, 
this picture of language and meaning, as based on conceptual dichotomies and 
hierarchies is often tacitly presupposed when, for example, claiming that we must 
give up speaking about the human or the animal as such6. What I aim to show is that 
the critique of humanism and the philosophical tradition in the literature I analyze 
articulate certain presuppositions of how to understand language, meaning and ethics 
that are completely metaphysical and theoretical in nature.  
 
The larger framework and theme of this thesis is critique and criticism in post-
humanist and feminist writings on the human and the non-human7. The question of 
how critique is understood, envisioned and practiced, I argue, is intimately related to 
how post-structuralist influenced scholarship understands “theory” or “philosophy” 
and the impact that “theory” has had on feminist and post-humanist scholarship8. An 
                                                                                                                                     
philosophy should be descriptive and throughout I use the expression ‘descriptive method’ to refer to 
this understanding. 
6 Toril Moi, writing about the impact of the post-Saussurean vision of language for ”theory” and the 
ways in which it has affected the field of critique and the epistemology of literary criticism, has 
inspired my writing greatly. For an in-depth discussion of the post-structuralist vision of language, 
and Saussurean and post-Saussurean thought, see Moi (2009, 2017). 
7 An in-depth analysis of the historical background of critical theories and to situate feminist and post-
humanist thinking within the tradition of philosophy is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for a 
description regarding the role critical theory and the tradition of the hermeneutics of suspicion has had 
on contemporary academic criticism, see Moi, 1999, 2009, 2017, Felski 2015, Braidotti 2013, Love 
2010, Felski and Anker 2017.  
8 I will talk about feminist and post-humanist theory and feminist scholarship and refer to these as 
traditions. When I speak about the influence of theory in these traditions, I mean the kind of work that 
is seen as central to the field, the requirements for defining something as serious, rigorous, well 
written and good scholarship. 
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aim of the thesis is to illustrate how a particular understanding of language, 
difference and exclusion, together with a suspicious and skeptic mode of critique 
articulates itself as an epistemological framework, and to show how this 
epistemological framework (“theory”) is politically justified, in the name of critique 
and “the political”. What I mean by this is that the vision of language and the 
understanding of concepts and meaning (the need to rethink or introduce new 
concepts), together with the analysis of power through exclusion/inclusion forms a 
picture in Wittgenstein’s sense of what critical thinking is and can be and of how 
things are and must be political, and how we can recognize the politics and the 
political in and of everyday life. I end the thesis by discussing what it means to 
understand the human/non-human and the human/animal as primarily political 
categories, and the idea the political aspect of these categories is why critique is 
needed in the first place.  
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Five sections structure the thesis. In the first chapter, I briefly contextualize the 
thesis in relation to contemporary debates on critique and post-critique and introduce 
three notions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that are central to the thesis: 
 
I) Wittgenstein’s notion of pictures that holds us captive. 
II) The craving for generality and the contempt towards particular cases.  
III) Emphasizing on how we need to look and see the workings of language. 
 
I elaborate on Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy, as one aim of his critical 
approach is to make visible some of the epistemic habits in the tradition of 
philosophy. By epistemic habits, I mean ways in which we habitually have a 
tendency to think in a certain way or tend to pose questions in a particular way. 
These initial tendencies then tacitly guide the way we answer the philosophical 
questions. For example, the question ‘do humans have a free will or not?’ might 
easily lead one to think that the answer has the form of an either/or response: humans 
are either free or not. Wittgenstein’s approach here is to take the question and start 
by examining what is already assumed in the question (either/or), and to further ask: 
how do we actually talk about free will in the context of human life and in relation to 
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human activities (science, literature, philosophy, everyday life, etc.)? His suggestion 
is to examine the ways in which notions of ‘free will’ are used, and then see if 
particular ways of speaking of having a free will or of not having one, make an 
sense, an if so, what sense they make. 
 
In the second chapter, I turn to central debates in feminist and post-humanist 
scholarship. I examine two examples from contemporary feminist thought, including 
Judith Butler’s understanding of the politics of the human, and Karen Barad’s 
influential theory of post-humanist performativity. I look at the work on 
performativity in Judith Butler’s thought and how feminist physicist Karen Barad 
has developed Butler’s notion of performativity in her post-humanist theorizing.  
 
In the third chapter, I focus on the work of Mel Y. Chen, discussing their notion of 
animacy. Mel Y Chen’s work is of interest to me as they9 have a background in 
linguistics and work with examples of ordinary language use, but their style and 
theoretical approach differs significantly from the tradition of ordinary language 
philosophy, in emphasizing the political aspects of language and language use. I am 
interested in investigating the kind of understanding of language and politics that 
underlies Chen’s writing, as their work is exemplary of the trans-disciplinary attempt 
to bring together the insights provided by several contemporary areas of critical 
studies.  
 
In the fourth chapter I discuss Patricia MacCormack’s post-humanist ethics. Patricia 
MacCormack suggests that the distinction human/animal as we know it is inherently 
problematic and unethical. MacCormack’s core argument is that we need to rethink 
ethics in a way that undoes our notions of ‘us’ as human and ‘them’ as animals. The 
political and ethical question for her is one of emphasizing life in its infinite 
heterogeneity, giving up categorical thinking (humans, dogs, insects, animals) and 
attending to the singularity of every life. I ask how we are to understand 
MacCormack’s moral vision, conceptual politics and post-humanist critique of the 
philosophical tradition as a practice of critical thinking and philosophy? What kind 
                                                
9 I have only seen gender neutral references to Mel Y. Chen and have therefore chosen to use the 
pronoun they as I have not found any references to Chen indicating a female or male gender identity. 
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of picture of critique, ethics, language and meaning does MacCormack embrace and 
how can we make sense of her abolitionist standpoint if we attend to the different 
meanings and forms that our relationships to animals take and can take? 
 
In the fifth chapter I discuss an example from ape language research, of an encounter 
between an animal and a human. I consider philosopher Pär Segerdahl’s experience 
of encountering Panbanisha, a bonobo in a laboratory where apes learn language 
(Segerdahl 2014, 2009). I examine this example in order to illuminate some of the 
different philosophical approaches concerning language and ethics that emerge in 
feminist post-humanist theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy. In conclusion I hope 
to show that moral meaning or ethics are interrelated with the ways in which we 
think about language and meaning, and that defining the meaning of 1) concepts, 2) 
human – animal differences or encounters, or 3) ethics in general terms, excludes the 
possibility of being open to the variety of ways in which human and animal life 
matter to us. 
 '
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Rita Felski (2015) notes when writing about the moods and modes of critique in the 
legacy of post-structuralism and the hermeneutics of suspicion that: “modes of 
critical thought are also forms of orientation toward the world, shaped by sensibility, 
attitude, and affective style. Yet the role of such factors in the shaping of 
contemporary scholarship is rarely acknowledged” (Felski 2011: 219). What she 
points to here is the way in which a writer might reveal their own perspective and 
express an understanding of the world, not fully articulated or argued in a text. Felski 
describes how being critical also includes an attentiveness to what words we use, and 
how we emphasize particular words instead of others. She highlights how modes of 
critical thought also contain pictures, understandings and presuppositions that we 
might not always be fully aware of.  
 
I will here discuss what this means in relation to Wittgenstein’s descriptions of how 
“pictures holds us captive”, a phrase he uses to show how we cling on to 
metaphysical notions of how things must be. In relation to the theme of this thesis 
these are ideas that are articulated as how things cannot be or how they must be 
(“knowledge is power”, “epistemology is always a matter of the political”). I further 
introduce and discuss some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in The Philosophical 
Investigations and in The Brown and The Blue Book that I reference in my analysis 
of feminist posthumanist thinkers. I use the debates over the meaning of the word 
woman as an example to illuminate how Wittgenstein’s remarks are useful in 
dissolving some of the confusions that arise in debates over the meaning of words. 
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We can read Wittgenstein as exposing implicit modes of thought when he describes 
philosophical problems as departing from “pictures holding us captives”. He 
expresses this thought in the Philosophical Investigations:  
 
115. A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. 
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This paragraph should be read in connection with his previous paragraph in which he 
describes how a particular understanding of sentences and linguistic meaning 
saturates philosophy, and how it was a picture in his own previous work, holding 
him captive. There he writes: 
 
114. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This 
is how things are."——That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself 
countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and 
over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.  
 
Wittgenstein describes how, when we are philosophizing or doing theory, we cling 
to certain presuppositions and thoughts of how language works, or of what a concept 
is. Wittgenstein diagnoses these kinds of tendencies throughout his work. In 
paragraph, 114 and 115, Wittgenstein describes how a particular way of looking at 
language and sentences as having a general form comes to form a picture of how 
language must work. When he writes that a picture holds us captive, and we can’t get 
outside it, for it lays in our language and language seems to repeat it to us, one might 
easily misinterpret him as saying that language somehow tricks us. Yet this is 
exactly the picture he wants to contest. Wittgenstein wants to make us see the 
general form of a particular way of thinking. His criticism of how we are led to 
misunderstand the workings of language, and the aims of philosophy, is also 
expressed by him when he speaks of our “craving for generality”. The “craving for 
generality”, is related to what he describes as “a number of tendencies connected 
with particular philosophical confusions” and to our “contemptuous attitude toward 
the particular case” (1958/1965:17). In the Blue Book Wittgenstein writes:  
 
Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of 
science…Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say 
here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. 
Philosophy really is “purely descriptive” (1958/1965:17).  
 
When Wittgenstein speaks of the craving for generality, he points to the ways in 
which we are led “to look for something common to all the entities which we 
commonly subsume under a general term” (Wittgenstein 1958: 17). Wittgenstein is 
writing about the ways in which philosophers have a tendency to want to give 
explanations and answers to philosophical questions according to the standards of 
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the natural sciences, and to generalize and thus overlook the details of a particular 
case. The point is to make us aware of the fact that not all aspects of life can be 
understood through the models of the natural sciences, and that explanations of 
natural laws serve a different purpose than aiming to understand how things become 
meaningful to us in our lives. Here, the distinction is roughly described as one 
between scientific discovery and moral-existential questions. However, 
Wittgenstein’s approach is also useful for understanding the different ways in which 
we want to understand, explain, define and use our words and concepts.  
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Another aspect that I want to highlight, in connection with Wittgenstein, is his 
emphasis on how philosophers need to look and see the workings of language as it is 
used, instead of being caught up in pictures of how language must work, or 
generalizations of how it should work. Wittgenstein writes, regarding the workings 
of language, that there isn’t one thing common to all words, but rather affinities, 
similarities and differences. In explaining how he thinks of language and words he 
uses the analogy of games. Just like not all games share the same aspects, but still 
have similarities and affinities in order to be classified as games, words also are used 
in different ways, and have different meanings, depending on context. Wittgenstein 
writes: 
 
Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would not be called 
‘games’” – but look and see whether there is anything common at all. – For if you look 
at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and 
a whole series of them at that (§ 66).  
 
In the next section he speaks of “family resemblances” in order to illuminate what he 
means:  
 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family 
resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way.—And I shall say: 'games' form a family (§ 67)10. 
                                                
10 Other key Wittgensteinian terms here are ”language-games”, and ”family resemblances” which he 
mentions in relation to the distinctions we make in language and the several uses and meanings that 
one word can have.  
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A way of becoming clear then, about what Wittgenstein means when he emphasizes 
language use as a matter of “family resemblances” and urges us to ‘look and see’, is 
to work with examples and descriptions of our actual uses of language. Here, 
Wittgenstein wants us to let go of what he calls the ‘craving for generality’, the 
tendency we have to think of one use only, when in fact there are countless. He 
writes: 
 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?— 
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", 
"words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; 
but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, 
and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get arough picture of this from 
the changes in mathematics.) 
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. 
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: 
Giving orders, and obeying them— 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about an event— (§ 23). 
 
The debates regarding the use and meaning of the word “woman” is a case in point. 
The heated debates over the word woman in feminist politics often assume that to 
speak about women in general (to use the word woman) is problematic, as it creates 
the illusion that there exists an identity such as woman, that all women are the same, 
and that it therefore excludes the differences that actually (empirically) exist between 
women (Butler 1990). Language is conceived of as the source of power. According 
to Butler’s theory of gender performativity (Butler 1990), we become subjects in 
language, and the language we know is one that structures us hierarchically, 
depending on our belonging to gender, class, ability, race, sexuality, etc. This 
hierarchical difference-making is seen to be an articulation, in language, of power.  
 
There are important senses in which Butler’s theory is correct, we become who we 
are in communication with others, language is how we express understanding of 
ourselves and of other people. We give each other names for example, which is a 
practice that points to the moral character of our lives with each other (one can easily 
think of how eerie it would be to know a person with no name), but with naming 
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practices it isn’t as easy to make sense of this linguistic practice as being one of 
inclusion and exclusion or as constitutive of power. The concept of women is 
perhaps one of the most debated questions in feminist scholarship over the last 
decades. However, it is worth noting that denying the essence of the identity of 
woman does not equate the claim that women do not exist11.  
 
Within the perspective of the debates around the word woman different meanings 
and uses are seen as paradoxical or mutually exclusive. However, this paradoxicality 
often emerges from the perspective of expecting coherence or relying on a single 
definition of the word woman (craving generality). In Butler’s books Frames of 
War: When is Life Grievable? (2009) and Precarious Lives: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence (2004b), for example, the same logic of exclusion and 
inclusion is expressed as the idea that what is human defines the non-human, and the 
idea that valuable lives are defined in relation to non-valuable lives, and so on.  
 
Woman, however, is just as the word human, a word with multiple uses. Depending 
on the situation, we use different criteria: certain chromosomes, beauty ideals, 
conventional gender roles, official documents, genitals assigned at birth, the identity 
one lives by, names, or when describing a friend to a friend. The list goes on. If we 
look at how we talk about and use the word ‘woman’, we will see that different uses 
make sense and do so depending on the situation (the particular case). This means 
that I can use the words “man” and “woman” about the same person without this 
being a paradox, or necessarily an insult, despite the fact that on a conceptual level, 
these are seen as mutually exclusive (Segerdahl 2009a). We gender others and 
ourselves in manifold ways. It might also be the case that I don’t use the word to 
describe somebody as a woman despite the fact that they ‘look like a woman’, that 
their identity cards state that they are a woman, and that they play sports on a 
women’s team. I might call myself a woman, in certain situations, when using the 
locker rooms at the gym, but not identify as one in the way that I would understand 
myself as constitutively different from men, or as having something in common with 
                                                
11 For a discussion of these questions, and particularly the way it shows in Butler’s work see Toril 
Moi’s What is a woman? (1999). 
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other women. The point here is to clarify the ways in which it makes sense to 
meaningfully dispute the uses and meanings of the words we use12.  
 
In Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, the emphasis lies on the ways in which 
sentences gain their meaning in particular situations, under particular circumstances. 
The meaning of a word, a concept or a sentence depends on who said it, to whom it 
was said in relation to whom, when and where it was used, and so on. This sounds 
almost like a thesis or a theory of meaning, but it is not supposed to be understood 
like a theory or even method. It is more, one could say, the point of departure for a 
philosophical investigation, where the work of clarification begins. Talking about the 
distinction human/animal as implicating a generalized hierarchy, instead of looking 
for particular uses in particular cases, can be seen as an example of the tendency to 
generalize, that, when embraced as an intellectual habit, as Wittgenstein says, only 
‘leads us into darkness’. 13  Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of epistemic habits within 
philosophy, his understanding of language, and the role he assigns to philosophy as 
an activity in dispelling certain pictures, presuppositions or philosophical 
commitments, thus also becomes useful when reading the literature on the human 
and the non-human, and in diagnosing the epistemic habits of feminist and post-
humanist theory.  
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The emphasis on the performativity of knowledge, and the emphasis on 
exclusion/inclusion and the theorization of concepts through historicizing their 
meaning, are examples of ‘pictures’ and ideas that I have in mind when I talk about 
the epistemic habits within contemporary post-humanist feminist theory. One 
concerns the idea that there is an inherent problem on the conceptual level of the 
                                                
12 For a critical discussion of criteria and gender nouns, see (Segerdahl 2013). For a critical 
commentary on the theoretical question of gender intelligibility in Butler’s work, see (Ungelenk 
2014).  
13 In the Blue Book Wittgenstein writes about the craving to generality that ”This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can 
never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely 
descriptive” (11958/1965: 8) 
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human and the non-human. The concepts of human and non-human or animal are 
understood to be contingent, and a product of history. As such, they are something to 
be contested, for political, ethical and philosophical reasons, as they express and 
maintain relations of power and subordination. (This is MacCormack’s position as 
we shall see later on). A different, but closely related idea (or picture in 
Wittgenstein’s sense), is that knowledge and what is often referred to as knowledge 
production, is always problematic. Expressions such as “the violence of all scholarly 
research”, (Love 2016: 347, emphasis in original) relate to the way knowledge 
production is understood and become a habitual way of framing research ethical 
questions. Again, we see an abstract and quite generalizing attitude being expressed 
that is unhelpful if we want to philosophically discuss questions of for example 
violence involved in “knowledge production” and scholarly research. In what 
follows, I will discuss “pictures” similar to these that often implicitly involve a 
theoretical and theoreticist (Moi 1999) understanding of language and power. These 
include the discussions of performativity in contemporary critical theory as well as 
the Derridean understanding of iterable citation, as well as ways of formulating and 
asking questions. I will show how J.L. Austin’s work on performative utterances 
when taken up in contemporary critical theory, has in the aftermath of Derrida’s and 
Butler’s readings become a theory of language and meaning, quite different from the 
original work of Austin.  
 
 '
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The concept of performativity in connection to language was coined by J. L. Austin 
in his How To Do Things With Words (1962), in which Austin describes how certain 
sentences are performative, that is they have an effect that constitute the meaning of 
a sentence. His famous example is the one where he describes how a marriage 
ceremony only is valid if the right circumstances are in place, how the sentence “I 
pronounce you husband and wife”, is performative when it marks a woman and a 
man becoming husband and wife (in contrast to for example a situation that is part of 
a theater performance, where the uterance “I pronounce you husband and wife”, does 
not have a legal force).  
 
Jacques Derrida discussed and critiqued Austin’s account in the essay Signature, 
Event, Context (1988), which inspired Butler’s theory of gender performativity 
(1990). This is roughly the history of the concept that, since the 1990s, has become 
one of the most cited, debated and used concepts in gender theory, cultural studies, 
and literary theory and criticism. Performativity, as it is understood within 
contemporary theory, is strongly associated with the work of Butler and her anti-
foundationalist account or “refusal of ontology” (Mortensen 2015: 58). In her book 
Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (2003) Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
writes that this version of performativity has been so influential and widely used that 
it has become somewhat of a “signpost” for situating oneself within an epistemology 
of anti-essentialism:14  
 
 
                                                
14 An in-depth analysis of the ways in which performativity was used by Austin or others following 
him (the take up of Derrida’s reading and Butler’s) is beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, 
worth noting that there are feminist scholars working on Austin and the concept of performativity 
outside of the Derridean/Butlerian framework of anti-essentialism and the debates Sedgwick is 
referring to. The writers I have in mind work within the tradition of ordinary language philosophy 
after Austin, Cavell and Wittgenstein, and have a different take on the relationship of language and 
reality than most commentators of Austin within contemporary theory (for example, see Bauer 2015, 
Moi 2017). 
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Austinian performativity is about how language constructs or affects reality rather than 
merely describing it. This directly productive aspect of language is most telling, for 
antiessentialist projects, when the utterances in question are closest to claiming a simply 
descriptive relation to some freestanding, ostensibly extradiscursive reality (Sedgwick 2003: 
5).  
 
 
In post-structuralist parlance, as Sedgwick defines it, the concept of performativity 
often works to underline the political effects of a concept: what it does, or the reality 
it creates. Performativity is understood in opposition to description, as being a 
critical and analytical account, and an explanation of how things come to have 
meaning. This has the effect that description, a central concept to Wittgenstein 
becomes an eschewed word within the traditions of anti-essentialist epistemologies, 
such as, for example, within queer theory (Love 2010). Sedgwick further writes that 
this anti-essentialist epistemology has also leaned on Michel Foucault’s work on the 
productive force of taxonomies and discourses. These are presented as descriptive, 
but one of Foucault’s key arguments is that taxonomies and discourses also have a 
productive aspect to them. Bringing together the Foucauldian analysis of the 
productive force of classifications and discourses with Austin’s philosophical notion 
of performative utterances, becomes a way of conceptualizing performativity that 
end up in a theoretical outlook, or a picture in the Wittgensteinian sense. It becomes 
a picture in which concepts and words as such have a performative force.  
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That words are performative is the underlying logic behind Butler’s famous (and 
strongly Foucauldian influenced) argument about gender performativity. Butler 
argues that there is no pre-existing ontological reality to gender, but that gender (or 
sex/gender) is described and thus “made” in language. It is the performative twist of 
language she claims, that creates the illusion of existing gender identities. Talking 
about gender identity, Butler would say, constitutes a kind of metaphysics of 
substance (Butler 1990: 27-30). The use of words like “woman” she argues, creates 
the impression that women exist as an entity, an identity or essence, despite there 
being no ontology or reality to gender. When feminists talk about women as the 
subject of a political movement, Butler argues, they are not only describing their 
political subject, they are also creating it through a politics of representation: “And 
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the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political 
system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation” (Butler 1990: 4). This 
Butlerian phrase has become famous in feminist theory in the debates over the 
meaning and use of “women” as a category.  
 
“The performative force” of a concept thus designates that language not only 
describes but also constructs, or has effects in different ways, on reality. The 
emphasis in this performative account is on what words do, and what they fail to do 
in the ongoing production of meaning, an idea that is influenced by Derrida’s 
response to Austin in trying to answer the question of how we agree on the fact that 
things mean what they mean, and trying to answer the question of how words gain 
their meaning in the first place. How is it that we “agree that bets are bets, that 
marriage is a meaningful institution, that parents have a right to name their 
children?” (Chinn 1997: 296). Derrida, with questions like these in mind, develops 
Austin’s original lectures on performative utterances and sets up an explanation that 
relies on a previous structure being in place, which he calls reiteration, or iterable 
citation.  
 
“Iterable citation” is a theoretical outlook on language and meaning. It tries to 
answer the question of how words come to mean something, and more specifically, 
how words mean different things in different contexts. It is intimately connected to 
the question of representation, and metaphysics: how do words and world connect? 
What is the relation between language and reality? Derrida’s “iterable citation” 
(Derrida 1988) can thus be understood in connection to the question of critique: what 
do we do when we philosophize and how is philosophy understood as acts and 
practices of critical thinking? I will return to this.  
 
The concept of performativity, as taken up in the aftermath of Butler’s work, is thus 
quite different from Austin’s original philosophical project of describing the 
distinctions we make in language15. Despite Sedgwick using the notion of Austinian 
                                                
15 On how Austin and ordinary language philosophy in general has been misunderstood in anti-
essentialist projects, see Toril Moi (2009, 2017). On the differences (and similarities) of Cavell’s and 
Derrida’s reading of Austin, see for example (Wolfe 2009, Cavell 1995: 42-65).  
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performativity, the understanding of performativity she speaks of, seems to more 
closely resemble Butler’s and Derrida’s version of it. The Derridean and Butlerian 
versions of performativity together with the Foucauldian emphasis on power as 
productive has become one of the most dominant critical epistemological 
frameworks and habits in contemporary theory. What this means is that language is 
understood to have specific agency, or a ‘force’ that acts in the world in various 
ways. What is it that makes an utterance performative or non-performative? Despite 
having a particularly sharp eye for the manifold distinctions that we make in 
language and having explored the kinds of categories our expressions can make up, 
Austin, at the end of How To Do Things With Words, gives up the distinction he sets 
up at the beginning of his analysis. When discussing Austin, Sedgwick notes that in 
relation to him, it might be more appropriate to think about distinctions as a map-like 
set of relations (Sedgwick 2003: 5), a thought Sedgwick does not elaborate on, but 
which is one that resembles Wittgenstein’s comparison to how language works:  
 
Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old 
and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded 
by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform house 
(paragraph 18 of the Philosophical Investigations).  
 
Wittgenstein is here making the comparison to underline the way in which language 
and culture, or our forms of life, go hand in hand, but does not follow a specific, 
already defined pattern. Language evolves, as our life forms change; there is a 
spontaneity or unpredictability to the process, one that cannot be captured by a 
theory of meaning. Language does not have a performativity of its own. Some words 
and sentences can have the effect of being performative, as Austin describes, others 
do not. I will return to the distinction between Wittgenstein and Derrida later, to 
discuss how it comes to make a difference concerning how we can read and 
understand feminist post-humanist ethics, as well as the distinction between the 
human and the animal, and the human and the non-human. Derridas version of 
Austinian performativity has however had a huge impact on feminist theorizing, in 
particular through the uptake of the work of Judith Butler and her understanding of 
how language and language use constitute meaning.  
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The theme of the human in Butler’s writings relates to her theorization of norms and 
intelligibility. For Butler, the question of who counts as human is related to whose 
lives are considered livable and grievable, and who is recognized as human (Butler 
2004). Butler takes up the human as a racialized concept, and focuses on ways in 
which its meaning has been historically crafted through discourses on race, in 
addressing Franz Fanon’s well-known post-colonial critique of humanism in Black 
Skin, White Masks. Fanon writes that ‘the black is not a man’:  
 
 
The category of the “human” retains within itself the workings of the power differential 
of race as part of its own historicity. But the history of the category is not over, and the 
“human” is not captured once and for all. […] If there are norms of recognition by 
which “human” is constituted, and these norms encode operations of power, then it 
follows that the contest over the future of the human will be a contest over the power 
that works in and through such norms. That power emerges in language in a restrictive 
way or, indeed, in other modes of articulation as that which tries to stop the articulation 
as it nevertheless moves forward. That double movement is found in the utterance, the 
image, the action that articulates the struggle with the norm. Those deemed illegible, 
unrecognizable, or impossible nevertheless speak in the terms of the “human,” opening 
the term to a history not fully constrained by the existing differentials of power (Butler 
2004: 13).  
 
In the quote above, Butler highlights the historicity of the category of the human and 
its relation to power and race. Butler does not use the concept of performativity, nor 
does she use a Derridean vocabulary, but she does articulate the picture of how 
meaning works in language associated with performativity. Butler emphasizes 
power, language and norms of intelligibility. In drawing our attention to the politics 
of the human, she highlights the ways in which notions of the human are bound up 
with a history of violence and genocide, and that even if we can agree on the fact 
that all lives matter, some lives matter more than others16. These are important 
remarks, and ones that highlight the different ways of defining valuable lives, human 
and non-human, gendered and racial norms and what is meant by the human, when 
analyzing different forms of inclusion and exclusion, especially in political 
discourse17. What Butler’s critique targets, however, is a specific understanding, or 
what I would describe as a picture of, or a representation of, the category of the 
human as developed in the discourses of science, history and colonialism.  
                                                
16 Here the notion of ”life” can, of course be extended to the non-human, animals and other forms of 
life that we can say matter.  
17 Questions highlighted recently by for example the Black Lives Matter movement demanding justice 
for black lives in the U.S.  
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Butler’s rhetorical and interrogative style of posing questions that aren’t answered 
but left hanging, and followed up by further questions, makes her at times difficult to 
read. Her constant use of questions means she rarely states any straightforward 
claims, which leaves room for interpretation. Perhaps her style can be understood as 
an invitation for the readers to think for themselves. When emphasizing claims that 
are made in the name of the “human” by “the illegible, unrecognizable, or 
impossible”, Butler shows precisely the ways in which the politics of the human are 
enacted - how some humans are included, while others are not. This emphasis on 
enactment indicates the picture described above in the previous section. Words and 
the use of words are political acts, and thus meaning is made, performed, enacted. 
The meaning of the category of the human has been crafted over time, says Butler. 
When Fanon reveals our cultural understanding of the human by writing “a black is 
not a man”, it means, writes Butler, “that the human in its contemporary articulation 
is so fully racialized that no black man can qualify as human”. Fanon’s critique, 
according to Butler, also suggests that he is “opening up the category to a different 
future” (Butler 2004: 13).  
 
There seems to be a tension in the ways in which Butler approaches the category of 
the human here: on the one hand, power and norms emerge in language, crafting the 
meaning of the category, which seems to be a kind of fixed process: “that the human 
in its contemporary articulation is so fully racialized that no black man can qualify as 
human” (Butler 2004: 13, emphases added), while on the other hand, the meaning is 
‘open’. The question is, whether power works in language in this “restricted way” as 
Butler claims. The “struggle with the norm” that Butler talks about make sense as a 
description of the genealogy of “the human”, its histories and uses. Likewise the act 
of speaking “in the terms of the “human””, is intelligible as a political claim. One the 
hand there is power “that emerges in language in a restrictive way”, on the other 
hand, Butler emphasizes the openness of the category, and perhaps hints towards 
uses that aren’t restricted by power18. The way she frames power as a part of the 
                                                
18 One can also note that obviously the kinds of distinctions that Butler is speaking of also show 
themselves in ordinary language use and everyday situations, not only in theory or philosophy. But 
the point is that questions of power and privilege aren’t the only aspects of how we talk about the 
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workings of language and meaning, while emphasizing a constitutive openness, is as 
we will see, paradoxical. It is, however, a dominant way of understanding language 
and power, as a matter of iterative meaning making processes, in contemporary 
feminist thought.  
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Karen Barad is a feminist thinker that has developed Butler’s notion of 
performativity in a post-humanist framework. She takes issue with Butler’s 
understanding of language, claiming that she is too linguistic in her thinking. 
However, Barad also shares aspects of the theoretical framework she claims to 
criticize, describing discursive practices as defining what counts as meaningful 
statements. The question is: how much of an intervention is Barad’s notion of post-
humanist performativity in current feminist debates on meaning, language and 
power? Barad’s opening paragraph of her article on post-humanist performativity 
expresses a sense of exhaustion over the linguistic turn and its focus on language and 
signification: 
 
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the 
interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every “thing”—
even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural 
representation. The ubiquitous puns on “matter” do not, alas, mark a rethinking of the 
key concepts (materiality and signification) and the relationship between them. Rather, 
it seems to be symptomatic of the extent to which matters of “fact” (so to speak) have 
been replaced with matters of signification (no scare quotes here). Language matters. 
Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing 
that does not seem to matter anymore is matter” (Barad 2003: 801).  
 
As a response, to the fact that “language has been granted too much power”, Barad 
introduces the notion “posthumanist performativity” as a new concept and 
epistemological framework beyond the linguistic theories of Derrida and Butler. 
Post-humanist performativity is introduced as a shift from an emphasis on language 
and the intentional, speaking human subject, to the role of human and nonhuman 
factors, materiality and ‘matter’ in the production of knowledge (Barad 2007: 89). 
Barad argues that ontology (being), epistemology (knowing) and ethics cannot be 
                                                                                                                                     
human and the non-human, although these are the hegemonic ways of addressing the question of 
difference in this literature.  
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separated, and that the question of performativity shouldn’t be understood as 
question of language only (Barad 2003: 802). According to Barad, post-humanist 
performativity “calls into question the givenness of the differential categories of 
“human” and “nonhuman,” examining the practices through which these differential 
boundaries are stabilized and destabilized” (Barad 2003: 808)19. For Barad, meaning 
is not only about the use of words, or language, but about the ongoing performativity 
of the world:  
 
 
Meaning is not a property of individual words or groups of words but an ongoing 
performance of the world in its differential intelligibility. In its causal intra-activity, 
“part” of the world becomes determinately bounded and propertied in its emergent 
intelligibility to another “part” of the world. Discursive practices are boundary-making 
practices that have no finality in the ongoing dynamics of agential intra-activity. (Barad 
2003: 821)20. 
 
Discourse, according to Barad’s reading of Foucault, is not to be confused with 
linguistic practices, or “what is said” but is that which “constrains and enables what 
can be said”. On this reading, discourse is intertwined with power, and this “power” 
enables and restricts what can and what cannot be said. Further, Barad claims that 
“[d]iscursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements” (Barad 2003: 
819), and goes on to describe what a post-humanist account of performativity means, 
concerning the human and the non-human: 
 
[Barad’s] post-humanist account of discursive practices does not fix the boundary 
                                                
19 Barad distinguishes her understanding of understanding performativity from Butler’s, as iterative 
intra-activity, rather than iterative citationality. Barad thus questions what she sees as an 
anthropomorphic understanding of performativity in Butler’s work. For Barad, non-human bodies 
also come to matter through ‘the world’s performativity, its iterative intra-activity’. Barad, however, 
holds on to the idea of performativity and Derridean iteration (knowledge is political, has effects that 
are contingent, language/meaning is a structure of success and failure) as such, which means that her 
position ends up being quite similar to Butler’s. Barad writes: ‘practices by which the differential 
boundaries of the “human” and the “nonhuman” are drawn are always already implicated in particular 
materializations’ (ibid). Her argument, thus, is one concerning theories of materialization as ‘always 
already material-discursive’, and not one regarding language use only.!
20 Barad speaks of ‘performance of the world’ here, but later (p. 823) and in other pieces, she talks 
about the performativity of the world while making the same point about the inseparability of matter 
and meaning. See, for example, the interview with Barad in (Dolphin & van der Tuin, 2012: 69). 
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between “human” and “nonhuman” before the analysis ever gets off the ground but 
rather enables a genealogical analysis of the discursive emergence of the human. 
“Human bodies” and “human subjects” do not preexist as such; nor are they mere end 
products (2003: 821).  
 
 
Barad can here be read as saying something similar to Wittgenstein, regarding how 
words and concepts gain their meaning, namely by their use. The difference is, 
however, that Barad assumes there to be an internal mechanism to the discursive 
practices of language – one that determines what is meaningful and what is not, 
what can be said and what cannot be said. This is the kind of metaphysical picture 
that Wittgenstein criticizes, and one that many anti-essentialist projects, despite their 
emphasis on the “metaphysics of presence” still assume. Barad reiterates here the 
basic premises of the anti-essentialist standpoint described by Sedgwick. I.e. she 
questions the ‘givenness’ and ontological basis of categories such as the human and 
non-human (or concepts like gender, identity, nature etc.). An interrogation into how 
categories gain their meaning, (genealogy, historicity), through what is excluded and 
included, how meaning is stabilized and destabilized (iteration), is accompanied by 
an effort to disentangle binary oppositions and theoretical assumptions that work 
with or create these differences.  
 
Barad formulates her view of how the category of the human gains meaning in a 
slightly different vocabulary than Butler, but both understand the meaning and 
category of the human as open-ended. Barad’s point, if I read her correctly, is to say 
that the ways in which the human and the non-human gain meaning is always 
contextual, or as Wittgenstein would say, meaning is revealed in the use of language. 
She adds, however, the aspect of power as an act of exclusion: “The differential 
constitution of the “human” (“non-human”), is always accompanied by particular 
exclusions and always open to contestation” (Barad 2003: 824, emphasis added). She 
thus paints a picture of language and meaning that is paradoxical to her own 
emphasis on open-endedness, precisely because it is a theoretical picture of how 
language, words (matter) and meaning work, abstracted from the particular cases she 
also highlights (human bodies and subjects do not pre-exist, nor are they end 
products, as she writes). My point here is not to engage with Barad’s theory of post-
humanist performativity in detail, but to describe the ways in which she shares a 
similar theoretical picture of how meaning emerges with Butler, despite the 
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differences in how they understand ontology and the role language and materiality 
plays in the process of signification.  
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Barad and Butler, despite their different vocabularies and philosophical approaches, 
analyze the framework in which the categories of the human and the non-human 
become intelligible in a similar manner. An example of this is the way in which they 
both express the idea that power is always implicated in language use and meaning 
making practices, and that forces of inclusion and exclusion are always operative, 
regardless of what the phenomena that is discussed or analyzed. We thereby have a 
picture where: 
 
a)  meaning arises because contrasts are always drawn (difference as the 
generator of meaning) 
b)  these contrasts are effects of power (exclusion) 
c) meaning is always open to contestation (never ‘fixed’) 
 
Barad and Butler are often seen as thinkers who represent different strands of 
feminist and post-humanist theory. What I have emphasized here is that despite their 
differences, they share a similar understanding of meaning. This includes the picture 
that meaning is an effect of power and historicity, it concerns processes of inclusion 
and exclusion, and meaning is always open to contestation. Underlying this picture is 
the idea that ordinary language, perhaps because of its historicity, is somehow 
contaminated or problematic, and thus must be replaced by newer, more 
‘complicated’ vocabulary that can challenge the problematic of our existing 
concepts21. In the next chapter, I will discuss how this picture of language and 
meaning shows itself in more recent feminist and post-humanist thought regarding 
the human and non-human.  
 
                                                
21 This idea is explicitly expressed by Butler in the introduction to the second edition of Gender 
Trouble, where she writes that she has in the tradition of Adorno, learnt that there is nothing radical 
about common sense, and that grammar imposes restriction on thought and the thinkable (1990: xviii-
xix). This idea can also be found in versions of Deleuzian feminism that aims to produce new 
concepts (see e.g. Grosz 2010, Braidotti 2013).  
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In their book Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering and Queer Affect (2012) Mel 
Chen considers the political grammar of animacy and describes, among other things, 
how objectification and dehumanization as linguistic insults express a hierarchy of 
the animate and inanimate in our culture22. Chen calls this the politics of animacy: 
“what linguistics call animacy hierarchy, which conceptually arranges human life, 
disabled life, animal life, plantlife and forms of nonliving material in orders of value 
and priority” (Chen 2012: 3) Chen describes animacy as a political conceptual 
hierarchy and ordering of things, related to ”lifeliness, sentience, agency, ability, and 
mobility in a richly textured world”. Chen further considers this politically dominant 
hierarchy, as “one potentially affected and spread by the Christian cosmologies, 
capitalism, and the colonial order of things” (Chen 2012: 29-30). Similar to Butler 
and Barad, Chen describes a politically dominant conceptual ordering shaped by 
what or who counts as human, and what or who does not. Animacy is thus internally 
related to gender, race, sexuality, species differences, ability and disability.  
 
Chen’s guiding question is how animacy matters in the critical and political sense, 
how it shows as a pattern in our culture, in ordinary language, ways of thinking and 
understanding the world and degrees of living and non-living in it (2012: 55). In this 
chapter I analyze some of Chen’s claims, in particular in relation to everyday 
language use. I also present and discuss Chen’s criticism of J.L. Austin’s use of the 
                                                
22 Chen provides an example of dehumanization and objectification, by discussing a case where a 
Virginian U.S senator at a rally in 2006 pointed at the only non-white person (with South-Asian 
heritage) at the event with the following words: ”This fellow here, over here with the yellow shirt, 
macaca, or whatever his name is. He’s with my opponent. He is following us around everywhere. And 
it’s just great…. Let’s give a welcome to macaca here. Welcome to America and the real world of 
Virginia” (Chen 2012: 31). Chen relates this event to Franz Fanon’s famous example of being hailed 
at by a boy on a crowded train station in Algeria, where a little white boy points at him and shouts, as 
Fanon writes: “Look! A Negro! … The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the 
Negro is ugly; look, a nigger” (Fanon 1967: 111-113). Similarly to Fanon, Chen points to the 
historicity of a racial politics of animality concerning the Allen case (Chen 2012: 34). Chen sees these 
as examples of the historicity of racialized acts of dehumanization and objectification, where the act 
of being an objectified subject becomes interchangeable with that of an animal (for an in depth 
analysis of the incident, see Chen 2012: 30-35). 
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word monkey and colorable in his discussion of performativity in How To Do Things 
With Words, and discuss how Chen’s criticism can be seen as an instance of a 
political criticism that is ultimately an effect of the presuppositions of the thinker, in 
this case Chen.  
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Like Barad, Chen emphasizes the political and ethical aspects of language use: “The 
sentience of a noun phrase has linguistic and grammatical consequences and these 
consequences are never merely grammatical and linguistic but also deeply political” 
(Chen 2012: 55). What I take Chen to emphasize here (it is a bit unclear to me what 
they mean by “the sentience of a phrase”) is that language use is affective in that we 
express different forms of feelings and emotion in language, and that choice of 
words also reveals, and is internally related to, how we see things and what we think 
and how we feel. Now, this claim can be understood in different ways: Chen 
considers it as an aspect of the political. But there is also a personal level to our 
language use: The way we feel, react and express our thoughts in language also 
reflects who we are.  
 
Unlike Chen, I don’t see animacy as the source of affect in language. I don’t see 
anything as the ‘source’ of affect, rather affects are a part of who we are, an integral 
aspect of how we see and understand things, as sentient human beings. Sentences of 
course work, function and signify beyond their grammatical and linguistic 
definitions. The ways in which we think about the personal and moral dimensions of 
language use and referencing categories cannot be explained or justified by 
referencing a theoretical model of language/meaning or power, but draws its 
‘justification’ (if it at all needs to be justified) from elsewhere.  
 
What I mean is that the ways in which we find things meaningful or meaningless is 
already an internal part of how we live and is not what needs to be explained but is 
already the origin of our explanation. Anything else would constitute the kind of 
metaphysical explanation that Wittgenstein and others have questioned. In making 
their case regarding how different dehumanizing practices express a hierarchical 
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ordering of the world, Chen investigates, among other things, phrases we use in 
ordinary language. Chen shows how objectification and dehumanization are 
expressed in language, by providing examples of phrases like: 
 
1) “I just don’t want to be a vegetable” 
2)  “Being treated like a dog” 
3) “I don’t want to be a stone” 
 
The first example is discussed by Chen as an example of a sentence uttered by 
someone 
who fears the loss of mental capacities, whereas the second is read by Chen as 
enforcing the hierarchy between human and animal. As plant life is generally valued 
lesser than human and animal life in our culture, and being treated like a dog means 
not being treated according to the standards of how we treat or should treat other 
people (human beings) or dogs, both a difference and a hierarchy is enforced. The 
sentence “I don’t want to be a stone” is described by Chen as grammatically 
“ambivalent” or “incorrect”, as it testifies to how the inanimate becomes situated 
lowest on the animacy scale in the ontology of affect.  
 
I just don’t want to be a vegetable” while seemingly and imaginative fancy, also 
informs, microcosmically and iteratively, of what proper humanity resembles – 
nonvegetables – and, further, that humans could in some way become vegetables. 
Further it describes what discredited human subjects are like: vegetables. Indeed 
vegetables believed to be living, are not at the bottom of the animacy hierarchy as 
stones seem to be; for instance, when humans and nonhuman animals eat them, they 
have specific effects and can be either nourishing or toxic to bodily systems (2012: 41).  
 
Chen’s perspective might feel like a correct description of how value hierarchies are 
enacted culturally if we look at how systematic racism is in our society, or how 
systematic the maltreatment of farm animals are despite demands for better 
conditions. But this is only one interpretation or perspective that we can take on 
these sentences and the question of the human and non-human. Chen’s work 
emphasizes ordinary language and language use, discussions that often seem to 
disappear in post-humanist critiques that express a fatigue regarding the legacy of 
the linguistic turn. Like Butler, Chen emphasizes, the formal aspects of language, 
grammar and meaning. On the one hand, Chen writes that they take a rather 
“uncommon” approach as a linguist by not focusing on the dominant animacy 
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norms” but on the “failings” of this conceptual hierarchy, the “ambivalent 
grammaticalities”, which are seen as internal to the “system” itself (Chen 2012: 30). 
Language is by Chen understood as a system of failure and success, similar to 
Derrida’s understanding of iteration, and Butler’s view of the possibilities of 
subversion of grammatical norms regarding gender. On the other hand, one might 
argue that Chen’s approach is anything but uncommon, precisely as they express a 
thought where language is seen as having some internal qualities, in itself detached 
from language as something that occurs between humans, and requiring its speakers. 
The idea that language carries meaning in itself is a metaphysical, scientist idea, 
common to linguistic theories of meaning. The question that leads my discussion 
here is how we are to understand the picture of language and meaning that Chen 
uses. Isn’t language and meaning a much more manifold and complicated matter 
than merely a system of failure and success, or an expression of hierarchies? Chen 
writes that there are “ambivalent grammaticalities”, but what exactly do they mean 
by ambivalence here? It seems as if Chen, despite the emphasis on ambivalence, still 
works with a specific idea of meaning as a question of structure or grammar. In their 
discussion regarding the sentence “I just don’t want to be a vegetable” they write: 
 
This sentence simply does not make sense unless it is understood as a disawowal of the 
next relevant position on a cline, a position to which one could slide if deprived of 
certain subjective properties. Between a vegetable and animal lies a notable 
conventional difference in mentality, if we can call it that: the presence of an entity 
called the brain, which is commonly afforded the locus of thought. *“I just don’t want 
to be a stone” … however seems to go too far within this dominant hierarchy (and thus 
receives a linguistics mark for ungrammaticality or unacceptability, the asterisk): some 
kind of animacy, some kind of thriving and sensitivity must be preserved for the 
person’s denial to highlight the major locus of difference between what is desired and 
what is undesired. The varying acceptability of these phrases reiterates that subjective 
properties are assigned to various stations on that cline, running from human, to animal, 
to inanimate, stone” (Chen 2012: 41, emphasis added).  
 
Here we are not offered “ambivalent grammaticalities” or openness of language use, 
but a strict structure of meaning and grammatical rules that serve as the framework 
for meaning. The phrase “I just want to be a stone” is marked as ungrammatical or 
unacceptable. But the point here is obviously that grammatical rules have certain 
functions and don’t represent the way in which language works in its multiplicity, 
especially in how we actually talk to each other in everyday life. The meanings of 
words are not determined by their lexical meanings. The phrase “I just don’t want to 
be a stone” can be perfectly ‘acceptable’, and make perfect sense in situations where 
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we actually use it, and when we talk to each other in everyday life. Perhaps I am 
expressing a difficulty of expressing emotions when talking to my partner, saying I 
don’t want to be emotionally closed. An example of the phrase being used in a 
context like this, is when the convicted drug trafficker Jane McKenzie talks to a 
journalist about her experiences of life in Bankok Hilton jail and the hardness of life 
in prison.  
 
You have to be tough to survive and you get tougher as the years go by. But I don't 
want to be a stone. When I get out I want to be the person that I was before, at least the 
good parts of that person. I try to keep a positive attitude and a strong mind” (Baker 
2002, emphases added). 
 
The fact that the word stone is used here, points to ‘unlively’, or ‘not-living’, but one 
could also say ‘But I don’t want to be numb’, or ‘I don’t want to be indifferent’. 
Now, these are other kinds of words and sentences where the word stone does not 
occur. But they are sentences that carry moral meaning when, for example, uttered as 
an apology, or as an outcry of fear, but importantly, in a different moral sense than 
Chen understands it. The point is that there are uses of the sentence “but I don’t want 
to be a stone”, or uses of the word “stone”, that don’t automatically provide evidence 
of the existence of an “animacy hierarchy”. The meanings words or sentences have 
in a life are not always captured by linguistic analysis of difference and exclusion. It 
is only if we assume that the use of words functions according to the logic of 
iteration, or that they always are an expression of power, or a process of 
inclusion/exclusion, that it makes sense to make that claim. In addition, other aspects 
of the ways in which language use is moral in character, gets lost. 
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Another aspect of Chen’s discussion of the animacy hierarchy concerns the roles 
theory and philosophy have in the larger context of cultural norms and conventions 
with regards to the animacy hierarchy. In this discussion, Chen too engages with the 
concept of performativity, and reads Austin’s work as an aspect of a colonialist 
imaginary and history. In considering “the animality of one originary moment in 
what is called “theory”” (Chen 2012: 93), Chen takes J.L Austin’s work on the 
performative in How To Do Things With Words as their example of how a colonialist 
past haunts contemporary critical theory. Austin’s work on the performative is 
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perhaps best known through his example of the marriage ceremony, and how certain 
“conditions” must be in place for a sentence to fulfill its performative force (a 
marriage to be legal). For a sentence to ‘do’ something, to be successful it must have 
its performative effect in place, otherwise it must be considered ‘unhappy’. In 
connection to this example, Austin provides the example of naming a ship, 
describing how someone seeing a ‘vessel on the stocks’, walking up, mashing ‘the 
bottle hanging on the stem’, and proclaiming to name the ship Mr. Stalin, is not 
enough for the ship to actually be named (Austin 1962: 23). The simple act of doing 
it is not enough to give an act its meaning. It needs to occur in the right context 
otherwise the act of naming is void. When discussing the conditions that need to be 
in place, Austin writes, and Chen cites him as follows: 
  
but one might also, and alternatively say that, where there is not even a pretense of 
capacity, or a colorable claim to it, then there is no accepted conventional procedure; it 
is mockery like a marriage with a monkey (Austin 1962: 24, emphasis by Chen). 
 
Chen reads Austin as responding to a sensed threat that “someone’s heteronormative 
and righteous marriage must be protected against the mockeries of marriage” (Chen 
2012: 96). The example is read as a part of a history of colonialism, where his use of 
a monkey is seen as anything but innocent, and as a powerfully loaded racialized 
trope. Chen doesn’t accept the humor in Austin’s example, nor do they discuss 
Austin’s theory of performativity as such. They focus on Austin’s use of the words 
monkey, mockery, capacity and colorable, and claims that “to tease out the 
undertones of his language is to explore the contemporary hauntings or habits of 
epistemological projection with regard to animality, sex, and race” (Chen 2012: 97). 
The racialized and anti-queer undertones of these words are explored, and the 
context Austin was writing in is analyzed:  
 
Austin’s monkey need not be innocent of this more generalized context. Already 
circulating was a long history of British and European associations of apes and 
monkeys with African subjects, fed, and conditioned by the imperialist culture of 
colonial relations (Chen 2012: 97).  
 
Chen mentions arrests of homosexuals in the 1950s in Britain, and laws on 
immigration as part of the larger context at the time Austin was living in. Regarding 
his use of the word colorable, Chen writes:  
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I read this as a suggestive provocation regarding “color” as an intensifier, one that is 
imbricated with questions of legitimacy and the force of law under which utterances are 
enacted … As existing scholarship tells us from many different disciplinary sites and 
indeed, as everyday language practices also confirm, vivid links, whether live or long-
standing, continue to be drawn between immigrants, people of color, laborers, and 
working – class subjects, colonial subjects, women, queer subjects, disabled people, and 
animals, meaning, not the class of creatures that include humans but quite the converse, 
the class against which the (often rational) human with inviolate and full subjectivity is 
defined (Chen 2012: 95). 
 
 
Chen understands ordinary language as the site of power where a cultural 
subconscious articulates itself, and where the animacy hierarchy, practices of 
exclusion, dehumanization and objectification are enacted. Chen’s work describes 
how the animacy hierarchy is reflected in our culture, and how a colonialist 
imaginary can be read into contemporary theory. The question is: do we have to 
accept this as an aspect of language as such? Perhaps it only makes sense as a 
description of a feature in our culture, one aspect of our history? Must we read 
Austin’s use of a monkey in his example as part of a racist colonialist history, and as 
expressive of an animacy hierarchy, as Chen does? Could that also be the conclusion 
drawn from a perspective where any use of either monkey, or animal, alludes to this 
history? This is the Derridean picture of iterable citation, where every meaning is 
connected by definition to how language works, in the abstract. 
 
I am not suggesting that the links described between racialization, gender and 
animals by Chen are unreal, or that exploitation of animals does not exist, or aren’t 
real issues and concerns. I am also not suggesting that the effects of colonialism and 
imperialism are phenomena in the past. They are very much alive today and part of 
societal structures, popular cultures, everyday lives and ordinary language and 
affective encounters between ‘us’ and ‘them’. My point is that there is a tendency to 
think about power, to critique difference and exclusion in a way where the only way 
of interpreting Austin’s example is to read it as an effect of, or expression of, power. 
This becomes problematic, as the object of our critique becomes produced by the 
critic (in this case Chen), and the hierarchy and exclusionary process is seen to 
infiltrate all culture and all language. The fact that the critic produces their object of 
knowledge becomes another epistemic habit unless we critically examine the 
presuppositions for doing so.  
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One could also imagine Austin, as making a critical remark with his use of “a 
mockery, like a marriage with a monkey”. One can interpret Austin as making 
exactly the point that Chen makes, in a critical vein regarding how monkeys are 
cultural symbols used to degrade some humans because of their skin color. The 
mockery might just as well reference the cultural practice of mockery, using 
monkeys, but this is not an option Chen even considers, due to their commitment to 
a particular theoretical understanding of language, meaning, and power. Other ways 
of thinking about critique, meaning, language and language use are excluded. Austin 
could obviously have written, “It would be a mockery, like a marriage with a car”, or 
pillow, or elephant, or something else, and it would be more difficult to draw the 
connections Chen does. But he did use the word monkey – which is an affective 
trope in the history of philosophy. However, Austin’s example can also be read as 
making a point about performative utterances. Chen doesn’t seem to be interested in 
the performative or performativity, but seems to be reading Austin and post-
Austinian theory as an expression of cultural anxieties and power relations, and 
obviously this is a reading one can make. But, what about Austin’s understanding of 
language and differences? How does he relate to distinctions, differences and 
hierarchies in language? In ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (1956), Austin writes:  
 
When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, 
we are looking again not merely at words (or ‘meanings’, whatever they may be) but also at 
the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to 
sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena (Austin 1956: 8 
emphasis added).  
 
I would say that Austin himself better articulates the problem with the realities we 
use the words to talk about than Chen does, exactly because he works with a concept 
of meaning and language that is one of constitutive openness. He acknowledges the 
historicity of our words and the many distinctions we make. Earlier in “A Plea for 
Excuses” he writes: “our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men 
have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in 
the lifetimes of many generations” (1956: 8). He does, however, write in a different 
spirit than the tradition of critique than Chen (and Butler and Barad) does. Again, I 
am not contesting that the connections that have been made culturally and 
historically between humans and animals in degrading ways are a part of our 
intellectual legacies. That they are is true. But to read Austin’s use of the word 
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‘monkey’ when making a point about his theory of performativity as an expression 
and effect of that history becomes problematic with regards to how to think 
critically, and to understand the workings of power in our culture. If the use of the 
word is enough to express ‘prejudice’, it is hard to imagine alternatives to thinking 
about our lives as nothing but a reiteration of our histories of oppression and 
meaning as defined by structures of power.  
 
In this chapter I have showed how Chen is held captive by a particular picture of 
how language and meaning works, not much different from the pictures Butler and 
Barad work with. I have discussed the ways in which Chen’s understanding of 
language, power and differences and the use of everyday language articulate a 
theoretical standpoint that gains its justification from its own theoretical 
presuppositions and is thus questionable as an instance of genuine critique. By 
contrasting Austin’s own words regarding the many distinctions we make in 
language with those of Chen, I have wanted to highlight the differences between a 
poststructuralist understanding of language and the understanding of language that 
Austin and ordinary language philosophers work with (Moi 2017). 
 
 '
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My final example of how the thematic of the human and the animal and language, 
meaning and power is articulated in contemporary feminist theory comes from 
Deleuzian feminist thought. A key voice in the literature is Patricia MacCormack 
and her work on post-humanist ethics. For MacCormack, the answer to the political 
and ethical challenges of the animacy hierarchy described and analyzed by Chen, 
especially with regards to the distinction human/non-human, is to replace the 
epistemological traps of humanist philosophies with a new vocabulary. MacCormack 
thus emphasizes a vocabulary influenced by Deleuze’s and Guattari’s philosophy, as 
one of relationality, assemblages, singularities, and intensities. MacCormack 
attempts to replace a hierarchical perspective with one that assumes what I earlier 
described as a ‘flat ontology’.  
 
MacCormack does, in her book make several arguments, and I will here only focus 
on her abolitionist standpoint towards animal ethics and the philosophical ideas she 
articulates in relation to this. MacCormack states in the first paragraph of the chapter 
“Animalities: Ethics and Absolute Abolition”: “What this chapter seeks is an 
absolute abolitionist stance on all interaction with – conceptually and actually – any 
nonhuman” (2012: 57).  MacCormack thus takes the “insight” of the claim that 
language is a matter of differences and hierarchization (that she shares with Barad, 
Butler and Chen) even further in claiming that this must mean that we should give up 
all our ideas, thoughts and activities with animals. She justifies her position by 
claiming, with a reference to Derrida that the universal erases the particular, a claim 
that can be read as similar to Wittgenstein’s criticism of our craving for generality 
and to our “contemptuous attitude toward the particular case” (Wittgenstein 
1958/1965:17). However, I argue that there is an important distinction in their 
perspectives and attitudes towards language and meaning and that this distinction 
becomes crucial when related to the moral meaning of critically assessing the 
different relations we can have to animals, and the role that these relations can play 
in our lives.  In the last section of the chapter I return to Chen’s perspective on 
language and meaning and discuss Chen and MacCormack together in order to show 
how they, despite being seen as different thinkers engage in similar questions and are 
in the thrall of similar pictures and understandings of language. 
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MacCormack defines post-humanist ethics as primarily a deconstruction of the 
human subject. MacCormack’s Deleuzian vocabulary is one where all lives are seen 
in their singularity, and thus not valued hierarchically through difference or 
exclusion, that is, by using concepts such as ‘human beings’ or ‘animals’, or by 
using phrases like “being treated like a dog”. For MacCormack these kinds of 
expressions already presume a categorization that is problematic as she claims, any 
use of these words will reiterate difference and hierarchy, atleast on a symbolical, 
conceptual level. MacCormack’s criticism targets the ways in which the distinction 
between human/non-human is and has been used in different ways to create an 
animacy hierarchy. In developing her ethic, McCormack claims she follows the 
insight of continental philosophies in arguing that “whenever we speak of the I/Other 
we are speaking of the self“ (MacCormack 2012: 5-6). MacCormack understands the 
difference between human – animal (or human – non-human) as formed in language, 
and thus formative of our thinking that articulates itself as an importunate contrast, 
and only seems to be able to articulate itself as a contrast reflecting back to our 
understanding of ourselves. According to MacCormack, as our relations to animals 
and discourses about them is an effect of the ways in which humans have exploited 
and used, needed and wanted animals, she sees the relation as parasitical. She argues 
that we should simply stop thinking about the animal.  
 
From the irrefutably important work done by animal rights philosophers and activists, 
unfortunate in its necessity, seeking equality, thinking needs to go further enough to 
accept thought itself as inherently unethical in reference to the nonhuman 
(MacCormack 2012: 57) 
 
… what gives us the audacity to ask any non-human life any question? The animal 
cannot be thought. Therefore ethically the animal should not be thought (MacCormack 
2012: 68).  
 
Perhaps one could read MacCormack as having in mind the gesture of talking about 
non-human animals, instead of just using the word animal, as a way of highlighting 
the political aspect of language use? But, her point seems to be more radical. 
MacCormack wants to give up any language use of the human and the nonhuman. 
This idea is based on the thought that one wants to avoid the problematic uses of 
“animal” as it entails a distinction that is problematic in and of itself 
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(human/animal). Another thought is that by talking about ‘the animal’, we are 
crafting a universal category, as Derrida seems to suggest (Derrida 2002)? For 
MacCormack, universality is in and of itself something that is to be avoided, as it is 
understood as epistemological violence, and neglects the singularity (or perhaps, the 
particularity) of every life. Universality functions, according to her as a 
generalization and in making this argument she references Cary Wolfe’s reading of 
Derrida as follows:  
 
buried under the definite article here [‘the animal’], is all the heterogeneity that makes 
the starfish so different from the ringtailed lemur; the eel from the zebra, (that makes 
the homo sapiens by the way, closer to their kin the bonobo and the chimpanzee than 
those great apes are to many of their fellow ‘animals’) (Wolfe, quoted in MacCormack 
2012: 59-60)23.  
 
Within this perspective, both ordinary language and philosophical discourse are seen 
as reiterating an order of hierarchical differences, and thus violence. The particular is 
seen as being erased under the universal. MacCormack seems to side with Wolfe in 
arguing that the conceptual erases any empirical differences. The task then, 
according to MacCormack, is to end all talk and thinking about humans and animals, 
as she too, as we shall see, understands any use of these concepts as inherently 
problematic. McCormack’s post-humanist ethics involves an absolute abolitionist 
standpoint regarding our relations to animals. She writes “posthumanist ethics of 
grace requires nothing more than leaving all animals alone; in interacting with them, 
in thinking them, in involving them at all with a human world” (MacCormack 2012: 
69). All speech, all thinking about animals, is thus, for McCormack, a question about 
reiterating the signifier ‘the animal’, which gains its meaning through the dialectic of 
human/non-human (similar to the ways in which ‘woman’ or ‘the subaltern’ are 
thought as signifiers in post-structuralist and post-colonial theory), which enacts a 
power relation. MacCormack’s position thus entails a generalization of the question 
or the human/animal where humans are always morally corrupted. MacCormack 
writes: 
 
                                                
23 It is interesting to note that Chen quotes Agamben for making a point about the making of the 
category of homo sapiens as a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human. The 
dialectic of ‘same’ and ‘different’ appears here too, but without commentary on the difference in 
grammar regarding human and homo sapiens.  
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There is no shared language between humans and non-humans. Any sympathetic 
argument about what interactions we may have or share with nonhumans is always 
limited to our thinking the encounter, even via abstracted language, thoughts from 
outside which delimit language. Many sympathetic to the wonder of encounters with 
non-humans elevate these encounters to some kind of mystical experience because they 
demand another kind of thinking of the encounter itself. But still the experience is 
human (2012: 58). 
 
 
In addition to being an example of a “craving for generality” in generalizing all 
encounters between human and nonhuman to anthropomorphism, her position on the 
human/animal also resembles feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s critique of the 
logic of sexual difference that Irigaray says saturates all being and all knowledge24.  
 
 
Woman and animal are human conceits, defined through denigration, the precise nodes 
which majoritarian humans wish to and need to reject to maintain human dominance. 
There are not and never were ‘women’ and ‘animals’, they were the phantasies of those 
with the right to signify (2012: 64).  
 
 
MacCormack’s critical remarks here can be understood as an argument against 
identity politics and against the kind of generalizations that Wittgenstein sees as 
“holding us captive”, still she ends up habitually seeing all instances of the human 
and the animal in the same way.  
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MacCormack’s radical passivity with regards to ethics, I would argue, is only 
understandable within a certain picture of language, one that expresses a general 
account of how things come to mean. This is a perpective within which “meaning”, 
both moral and political is defined and decided in abstract, in philosophy.25 Here we 
                                                
24 When Irigaray speaks of ‘the sex which is not one’, she refers to the idea that ‘woman’ cannot be 
represented within a masculine phallogocentrism. As all knowledge and being is defined by the 
masculine, the feminine is thus a product of this ‘system of representation’. The feminine could be 
described as a symptom in Irigaray’s thinking, that which is repressed but needed in order for the 
masculine to remain masculine.  
25 MacCormack is critical towards most thinkers who have tried to address our relations to animals. 
She denounces Donna Haraway’s (2008) attempts to discuss our relations to animals through the 
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have a general picture where meaning entails differences, this difference always 
entails an act of exclusion, and were meaning is always contestable. In other words, 
MacCormack, as does Chen, seems to work with generalized pictures of language 
and meaning that in one way or another are focused on exclusion, difference, 
meaning and power. The alternative (to the problem of reiterating suspicious 
dichotomies and meanings) often consists in an emphasis on relationality, intra-
activity and assemblages, and presenting an ethics of relation as the departure for 
moral inquiry26. But how are we to understand ethics, and change within the 
descriptions that Chen and MacCormack provide us with?  
 
It is clear that the words human and animal have multiple meanings, and simply 
using the words, does not mean that a politics of inclusion and exclusion (“animacy 
hierarchy”) is necessary in place, or that a “politics of the human”, is being 
reiterated. This would only be the case, if we assumed that words carry inherent 
meanings, that their use is determined by previous uses, or are expressive of an 
absolute logic. Chen for instance in her analysis of sentences like “I just don’t want 
to be a vegetable”, or someone being “treated like a dog”, pays attention to how 
these sentences “describes what discredited human subjects are like” (Chen 2012: 
41). Chen reads this as an expression of a disavowal of the next position to which 
one could glide if one lost certain “subjective properties”. She treats them as insults, 
and obviously they can be read as such, but there are also other ways of 
understanding these sentences, where their meaning and use depend on the context. 
Here Wittgenstein’s emphases on the notions of family resemblances and meaning as 
use are significant. One can easily think of other examples. The phrase “I just don’t 
want to be a vegetable”, can be a plea, an expression of fear for losing one’s 
cognitive abilities, or a child uttering a request regarding their role as an actor in a 
                                                                                                                                     
concept of companion species, and Derrida’s (2002) discussion of the animal. Haraway, according to 
MacCormack oedipalizes our relationships to dogs and attempts to naturalize an unnatural 
participation of dog and human, while Derrida’s discussion of the gaze (the cat watching him naked) 
is problematic, as the concept of the gaze is a human concept. This is also why she repudiates a 
Levinisian ethics, as his emphasis on the face is a human face. 
26 Levinas’ ethics consists precisely in this insight, but he is also dismissed by MacCormack for being 
too humanist in his thinking, as he emphasizes the face. This consists, for MacCormack, of an 
”exclusory ethics of external other” (MacCormack 2012: 15). 
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play where there are different roles: vegetables, humans, animals, and so on. One can 
think about a game being played at a tournament with competing teams: stones, 
vegetables, animals and gods and someone saying “I want to be a god”, “I just don’t 
want to be a stone” indicating what team they wish to play with. 
 
My point is not to deny that there are many ways in which distinctions between the 
human and the non-human are drawn that entail exclusions or are reflective of how 
power works, or how racialized and sexualized meaning making practices work. The 
point is rather that asserting a general principle of “difference as exclusion” means 
that one will never see uses of the words human or animal as not being corrupt in 
one way or the other. This is why so many use the expression non-human animals 
instead of just saying animals, or saying inhumanization instead of dehumanization. 
In assuming that power is always present, either in the various uses of language or in 
“processes of material-discursive reconfigurations of the world” (Barad 2003), or 
that the use of a word, concept or thought as ‘animal’ or ‘human’ is always unethical 
(MacCormack 2012), constitutes a kind of metaphysical assumption where all cases 
are seen under one description only. MacCormack cannot see the relations or 
questions of the human/animal in any other way, due to the terms of her own 
argument, and the pictures that hold her captive (Wittgenstein, PI § 11).  
 
With regards to the human/animal distinction, she claims that “The other is outside 
discourse therefore unspeakable” and that posthumanist ethics needs to attend to the 
fact that “when we speak of the I/Other we are speaking of the self” […] 
(MacCormack 2012: 5-6). Readers of continental philosophy will recognize the 
influence of Foucault, Derrida and others in her work. But the point of my reading is 
not exegetic in that sense. Rather, I want to bring into focus where her understanding 
of language and meaning take us, revealing those philosophical pictures that she 
works with in order to make her arguments. Here, I have in mind the kind of 
meaning that shows itself in our use of concepts such as ‘trust’ and ‘friendship’. My 
point is not to say that there is one kind of moral meaning to the concepts of trust or 
friendship, but that the kind of meaning we give to these concepts is internally 
related to how we are willing to see meaning in our relations to others – human and 
non-human. Even if we might not speak of our dog as our friend (although 
sometimes we might do that as well, imagine a child petting a dog and being a bit 
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hesitant in approaching it, and the parent saying, “go on, he is a friend”), we might 
apply the word trust for example in describing our relationship with the dog (“the 
dog trusts that I will take him out for a walk”). But we might not speak of an animal 
being ironic or showing contempt. Speaking of differences between the human and 
the non-human in these cases, makes perfect sense. These differences (for example 
speaking of irony or contempt) are part of the grammar of the human and the animal, 
but are not always a question of power, hierarchies or difference as exclusion. There 
are moral (and political) concerns when it comes to human and non-human relations 
that are rooted in our lives with animals, but that are of a different form than the ones 
addressed by animal rights discourses, or the ethics that derives its insights from the 
theories of ‘flat ontology’.  
 
In what follows I want to conclude my discussion by arguing that the post-humanist 
critique of decentering the human, and of understanding human and non-human 
interactions as relational or as a form of assemblage27 in Deleuzian terms, makes 
perfect sense. This insight or perhaps fact, is however, rooted in our forms of life, 
not in a theoretical understanding of conceptual politics, in a way that disrupts the 
notion of the necessity of a contrast. I hope to show that when the questions of the 
human and the non-human are thought of in this light, it becomes obvious that what 
we are considering here is also not purely an intellectual matter (Hearne 1986: 39).  
 
 
  
                                                
27 The term assemblage comes from Deleuze and Guattari’s AThousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1978) and is used as a metaphor or concept to designate an anti-structural ordering of 
things. An assemblage can thus be the forming together of several parts or pieces, that together form 
an assemblage, but there is no specific order in which parts come together. Their language is 
metaphorical, suggestive, and elusive, but the point here is to stress a change of perspective, to avoid 
dichotomous thinking. 
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In order to understand Wittgenstein’s ‘method’ or ‘methods’ in the Philosophical 
Investigations, one must understand the aims and questions he is working with. 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is difficult, not only because his ideas and criticism 
deeply challenge the epistemic habits and the technical vocabulary of the tradition of 
philosophy, but because oftentimes, in order to understand his perspective and 
criticism, one must, as it were, ‘change one’s attitude’ (Wittgenstein 1993: 161). 
Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy predominantly means becoming clear about 
one’s own ways of thinking, confusions and presuppositions. He does not provide 
straightforward answers, theses or methods through which to solve philosophical 
problems. Rather, his aim is to bring our attention to the ways in which we formulate 
our questions, set up an argument, how we think about them, and how we formulate 
them. This is where his approach bares similarities to the epistemologies of critical 
theories such as post-structuralism and post-humanism. Especially in questioning 
metaphysical underpinnings of questions or discussions, these traditions come close, 
but they are also significantly different in the conclusions they draw in their 
respective critical ‘anti-metaphysical’ inquiries (Moi 2009).  
 
In this chapter I return to Wittgenstein in order to illuminate how his remarks are 
useful in the reading of contemporary posthumanist theory. I discuss how he 
describes how a change in attitude is needed in order to dissolve some of the current 
pictures that function as habitual ways of explaining how language and difference 
matters in feminist theory. I also discuss paragraph 116 in the Philosophical 
Investigations, in which Wittgenstein describes how philosophers end up in 
metaphysics when they “try to grasp the essence of the thing” for example the 
essence of meaning regarding different concepts and words. I discuss how 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy helps us to dissolve the ideas central to the post-humanist 
feminist thinkers I discuss in previous chapters, about differences, hierarchization 
and power as residing in language. This chapter paves way for discussing how 
differences and the distinction human/animal can make sense in relation to language 
and also to the moral meaning of us being language users and speakers. 
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Under the heading ‘Philosophy’ from the so-called Big Typescript, Wittgenstein 
describes the problems of philosophy as not an intellectual difficulty of the sciences, 
but as “the difficulty of a change of attitude” (1993: 161). That is, he brings our 
attention to the ways in which we approach and understand philosophical questions 
and concerns, and the presuppositions that guide them. Describing philosophical 
arguments as the difficulty of changing one’s attitude, rather than focusing on 
intellectual difficulties and argumentation in the traditional philosophical sense, also 
means that his philosophy involves a moral-existential dimension (Backström 2011), 
and a self-critical gesture, not unlike the emphasis on ‘situated knowledges’ in 
feminist epistemology (Haraway 1988) 28 . Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
philosophy emphasizes the need to attend to everyday language use, as well as the 
human subject and human forms of life. Wittgenstein’s philosophy serves thus as a 
valuable resource for thinking about the personal and linguistic dimensions of the 
lives that we share with various others. In large part it does so by providing a 
different outlook on language, meaning and philosophy, and on the ethical 
dimensions of us being language users than the ones currently provided by the post-
humanist theoretical frameworks. His approach takes our ways of talking and acting 
in everyday life as the departure for our investigation but does not assume that it is 
something that needs to be justified or explained by this or that theory.  
 
As mentioned, in the beginning of this thesis, in the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein describes the philosophical task as combatting misunderstandings of 
how language works. He describes how unnoticed presuppositions guide our 
thinking that aren’t always made explicit, when speaking of pictures holding us 
captive. Wittgenstein draws attention to how philosophical, metaphysical pictures of 
                                                
28 The similarity here concerns the ways in which the emphasis on ‘situatedness’ involves a criticism 
of understanding science and knowledge through the idea of objectivity, where the knowing subject is 
ignored. Donna Haraway speaks of a ‘disembodied viewer’ as a scientific ideal, a picture of a 
scientific ideal. An in-depth inquiry into the differences and similarities between Wittgenstein and 
feminist science studies approaches is beyond the scope of my discussion here, but I find it important 
to notice that both problematize a scientific or scientist attitude to knowledge and objectivity as a 
generalizable attitude.  
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language and meaning can hold us captive, when he, in paragraph 116 of 
Philosophical Investigations, says we need to look at the actual use of language, at 
the grammar of a concept. He wants to draw our attention to the metaphysics 
underlying many of the ways in which philosophers have addressed questions of 
ontology and epistemology. He writes: 
  
When philosophers use a word -- "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", 
"proposition/sentence", "name" -- and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is 
its original home? –What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use (§116). 
 
 
Wittgenstein is here is talking about the difference between theorizing questions, in 
ways in which words and concepts in a theoretical language only become 
meaningful within that theoretical vocabulary, and between philosophizing about 
them: when the way we think, talk and use language in the context of our everyday 
lives (which includes theorizing of course) is what is scrutinized. The point is not to 
make a clear distinction between theoretical and ordinary language, but to bring the 
attention to our attitude in thinking about language, and language use, be it 
theoretical or not. Marie McGinn writes about the difficulty of understanding 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a question of understanding the nature of what she calls 
the “theorizing or theoretical attitude” (McGinn 1997:16). She underlines that one 
must understand the workings of this attitude (or epistemic habit) in order to 
understand Wittgenstein’s criticism of it.  
 
Wittgenstein does not in that sense provide us with a general theory of language, 
meaning, power or difference – but emphasizes how words gain their meaning in 
various ways, by pointing out how the same word can have many differences and 
similarities, where meaning is constituted by use and where use is seen under certain 
descriptions. This paragraph (PI §116) can thus be read as similar to what Barad, 
Butler, Derrida and others say, when they stress the contingency of concepts, effects 
of power, and that the different meanings a word can have are indeed seen under 
different descriptions (of exclusion, inclusion). So, what is the difference?  
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Let us take a look again at what Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical 
Investigations, regarding our use of the word games (we can here think about the 
concept of the human):  
 
Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would not be called 
‘games’” – but look and see whether there is anything common at all. – For if you look 
at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and 
a whole series of them at that (§ 66).  
 
A way of becoming clear then, of what Wittgenstein means when he emphasizes 
language use and urges us to look and see, is to work with examples and descriptions 
of our language use. Here Wittgenstein wants us to let go of what he calls the 
craving for generality, the tendency we have to think of one use only, when in fact 
there are several. Here we can think about the word ‘human’ (rather than ‘games’), 
as a word that has different uses. Some uses are expressions of power, others are not. 
Look and see. It is only if we let go of the idea that “the differential constitution of 
the “human” (“non-human”), is always accompanied by particular exclusions and 
always open to contestation”, as Karen Barad (2003: 824) formulates it, that it makes 
sense to talk about human beings without incessantly having to focus on the question 
of difference and exclusion.  
 
There are uses of the word and the concept of the human, that gain its meaning from 
the life forms that we share with others (human and animal), in the sense in which 
we speak of humans as having language and as living lives, where birth and death 
constitute limits for our existence. Again, an example might be helpful. We can think 
of phrases like ‘be a little human’, or ‘we are all human’. Here, the word ‘human’ 
functions not as an erasure of difference within the category, but as an expression of 
the fact that I am urging someone not to be so harsh in their judgment, or where I 
pass judgment on someone who has made a mistake. ‘We all make mistakes’ is 
another way of saying the same thing, without introducing the word ‘human’. 
Obviously then, one could argue that it makes sense to stop talking about the human 
altogether. The point is, however, that this won’t solve the problem of 
hierarchization, difference, or people being racist, but instead draws us towards 
policing language use, a practice that is justified in the name of the political, but 
ultimately only comes to serve the image that the critic has of herself as ‘critics’.  
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These examples I just gave about saying that “we all make mistakes” might seem 
strange or odd: What do they have to do with the political critique of the 
philosophical category of human? Here the point is that the uses of these words are 
not epistemological and do not answer the question of who counts as human but 
point to a moral dimension of language use. This is different from applying the 
perspective of ‘flat ontology’ onto all kinds of language use, as a theoretical 
standpoint regarding ‘what is’. That is, referring to the fact that our life form is 
human, also means that part of what makes it human is that it has a moral dimension. 
But what does this mean? If we take the post-humanist critique seriously and look to 
decenter the human speaking subject as the provider of meaning, and instead 
emphasize an ethics of relation, must we not then also complicate our understanding 
of that life form and the place of moral meaning in it?  
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Cora Diamond has written extensively on questions concerning meaning, 
philosophy, humans, language, ethics, and animals. In her article “Eating meat and 
eating people” (1978/2005) she writes about the ways in which the distinction 
human/animal is reflected in our culture:  
 
We learn what a human being is in – among other ways – sitting at a table where we eat 
them. We are around the table and they are on it. The difference between human beings 
and animals is not to be discovered by studies of Washoe or the activities of dolphins. It 
is not that sort of study or ethology or evolutionary theory that is going to tell us the 
difference between us and animals: the difference is, as I have suggested, a central 
concept for human life and is more an object of contemplation than observation (though 
that might be misunderstood; I am not suggesting that it is a matter of intuition) 
(Diamond 1978: 470, emphasis added). 
 
In this quote, one might hear Diamond saying something similar to those 
anthropocentric thinkers that post-humanist philosophers like MacCormack critique, 
by asserting that our understanding of what humans (or animals) are is a matter of a 
conceptual difference. Isn’t Diamond’s claim exactly the kind of argument that post-
humanists like MacCormack dispute? Diamond seems to uphold a notion where 
there is a difference between humans and animals on one hand, and a central concept 
to human life (essential to human life and hierarchical?), and differences and 
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similarities that are of a second order on the other hand (the fact that we can eat 
animals but also call animals companion species). The distinction between us and 
them is reflected and created in language, Diamond seems to suggest, it is part of our 
understanding of what makes us who we are. This is the picture McCormack 
assumes, and one that she opposes, and it is a picture that Chen describes through the 
animacy hierarchy. It is a conceptual difference and a practice that we learn, among 
other places, at our dinner tables, and a difference that is part of everyday life, 
something taken for granted, almost like a fact, which in turn acts as justification for 
the criticism of Chen and MacCormack.  
 
The question of how to understand this difference between human and animal as 
both a conceptual and a practical matter, however, is more complicated than what 
both Butler, Barad, Chen and McCormack seem to suggest. Because, one might ask: 
why hold on to a notion of the difference created in language, when the point of 
Wittgenstein (and often also by the feminist posthumanist thinkers I discuss) is to 
show that there are differences, and similarities, that criss-cross in our various ways 
of speaking of humans and animals in?  
 
It is important to note, however, that despite the similarity on the surface of 
Diamond and MacCormack’s accounts, there is a significant difference, regarding 
the conclusions they draw, which is also reflected in the different spirit in which they 
write and think about humans, animals, philosophy and life. Despite the fact that 
Diamond raises questions about the meaning animals have and can have in our lives, 
and describes the logic that is used to justify a difference between the human and the 
animal, she doesn’t assume difference to automatically mean exclusion or 
hierarchy29. Diamond’s essay points us in a direction to start thinking about these 
questions philosophically, without assuming a specific way or perspective from 
which to think about them, such as a particular theoretical understanding of 
language, power and meaning.  
 
                                                
29 This is the conclusion, but also the point of departure for many of the authors I discuss. Because of 
their theoretical understanding of power, language, meaning and differences, they actually assume the 
picture that is presented as their conclusion.  
  Salla Peltonen 
49 
 
Diamond seems to say that it is the moral dimension of language use and human 
lives that is the basis for the human/animal distinction, and that there are certain 
actions, like naming people, that are expressive of what kind of beings we are 
dealing with. Diamond talks about people, about us and them, experiences, and the 
affective aspects of our relations to animals, but not as a question of theoretical 
contemplation, or as an effect of language use. Rather, she points to something that 
runs deeper, I would say, something that concerns the role concepts have in human 
life (not only in philosophy). Diamond describes the difference as related to the fact 
that we don’t eat our dead, we don’t eat our own limbs, and that these are facts 
related to the difference between burying a dog and burying a human being. If we 
take this point further, we could think of other cases, for example, a situation where 
a city has been hit by a natural disaster and we are faced with a two or three-year-old 
child and a dog walking towards us. In a situation like this, it makes sense to say that 
seeing the child demands something from us, in a way that seeing the dog perhaps 
does not, and that it relates to how we see and understand the life of a dog and the 
life of a child or human. The child might not survive without our help, whereas a dog 
could.30  
 
Looking at the sentences that Chen discusses here, to ‘treat someone like a dog’ or 
‘treating a dog like a human being’ do not necessarily have to reference a 
constitutive difference on an ontological level, but might refer to the different ways 
in which we might respond to a dog and a child in different situations, for example in 
a situation as described above. Clearly, this is a kind of example where 
MacCormack’s ‘flat ontology’ would emphasize that the comparison in the example 
is problematic as such, as what matters is the life of that dog and that child, in their 
singularity, no matter what differences there are in how we see and understand dogs 
and children, and most importantly regardless of the context. There is a level of 
abstraction in MacCormack’s reasoning (despite her emphasis on singularity), that 
doesn’t quite capture exactly what it means for these lives to matter, or that they 
matter to us differently depending on the situation. This should not be understood as 
a matter of relativism, as if the criteria for how things come to matter to us are 
completely arbitrary. While MacCormack seems to work with a concept of an 
                                                
30 I want to thank Camilla Kronqvist and Be Nordling for providing me with this example.  
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abstract difference, that is an effect of historicity, that is expressed in all cases, and 
one that is inherently unethical regardless of what a description or situation entails, 
Diamond talks about a moral meaning that in different ways constitutes our relations 
to others (human and animal) in concrete situations in our lives. The question of 
encountering animals for example, as companion species, as pets, does engage us in 
relations of responsibility, friendship and joy, concepts that are intelligible to us 
beyond the generalized account of them being anthropocentric.  
 
I have emphasized the ways in which we talk about the human and the animal in 
different ways and how the same words and sentences can vary depending on the 
situation. In the article “Being humans when we are animals” philosopher Pär 
Segerdahl (2014) gives examples of the language games we use, the ways in which 
we talk about humans and non-humans, when we, for example, teach children 
language. Segerdahl uses as an example the sentence ‘humans are animals’ (a phrase 
and thought central to post-humanist discussions). He points out that there is a 
difference between how we talk about ‘humans as being animals’ in a scientific or 
biological sense, and when for example explaining to a child that ‘even humans are 
animals’. A central theme in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is to make the distinction 
between scientific ways of explaining and understanding things (craving for 
generality) and everyday ways of talking and acting. This means that a sentence like 
‘even humans are animals’ (Segerdahl 2014: 127), will come to mean different 
things, depending on if we are thinking about the human as an animal in the natural 
scientific sense (sharing DNA for example), or when we are trying to critique 
hierarchies of speciesism, introducing a ‘flat ontology’, where the vocabulary is seen 
as having political and ethical relevance. The point is that the different kinds of 
distinctions we make, make sense in different ways, in different situations. Not all 
are determined by “THE DIFFERENCE”, as Segerdahl describes it, of the 
metanarrative of the philosophical tradition regarding the human/non-human. 
Segerdahl writes: 
 
 
Most people know and can recite that humans are animals, a species of apes. Still, it is 
awkward to try to apply that knowledge directly to oneself: “I’m an animal” or “My 
parents are apes”. We can visit the biologist’s workshop and appreciate the fact that we 
are a primate species. But when we return home, it is embarrassingly difficult to figure 
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out how this fact should be understood there (2014:127). 
 
Segerdahl is addressing the fact that we use different language games, different 
descriptions when we talk about humans and animals and the relations between 
them. He makes a point about the grammar of humans and the grammar of animals, 
and the different ways in which the words ‘animal’ and ‘species’ come to signify, in 
multiple ways. I discuss Segerdahl here because he describes how him being 
reprimanded by an ape comes to disrupt the notion of there being a difference 
between the human and non-human, in the constitutive sense, and introduces us to 
the phenomena of what he calls ape-human morality. In the following, concluding 
section, I want to use his example, to show that despite the critique of MacCormack, 
Chen and other post-humanist philosophers, there are ways in which encounters with 
animals can make a difference philosophically, but that the value of these encounters 
can only be seen under certain descriptions. Namely if we let go of pictures holding 
us captive, such as “we cannot think the animal“ (MacCormack), or that “the 
differential constitution of the “human” (“non-human”), is always accompanied by 
particular exclusions” (Barad 2003).  
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The main topic of Segerdahl’s essay is to reflect on his experience of feeling 
“metaphysical vertigo” in encountering and being reprimanded by an animal in a 
laboratory for ape language research. Segerdahl is visiting the lab with the aim of 
observing linguistic behavior in apes. During his visit he meets the apes Panbanisha 
and Kanzi. The background for his visit is the discovery of how a young ape has 
learned to communicate in the laboratory. The young ape, Kanzi has not been part of 
the experiments and efforts to teach apes language, and the discovery that the young 
Kanzi has picked it up spontaneously is of interest to Segerdahl. Previous attempts to 
teach apes language have not succeeded, and the discovery that Kanzi communicates 
with the humans in the lab has also led the researchers in this particular lab to 
completely change their methods regarding language teaching. In reflecting on the 
discovery later on, one of the researchers in the lab, Sue Savage- Rumbaugh writes: 
“I decided to abandon all instruction and focus my attention instead on what was 
said to Kanzi rather than on what we could teach him to say” (Savage-Rumbaugh et 
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al. 1998: 26-7). In this laboratory, ideas about humans and animals, language 
learning and language use, are altered when the experiment is ongoing. The 
researchers start doing things with the apes, and becomes in a different way engaged 
and entangled in the lives of the apes. In reflecting over the fact that Kanzi had 
learned language in a similar way that children learn language, being around people, 
Segerdahl notes that speaking to Kanzi “presupposed having things to say that could 
be of significance to both ape and human” (2014: 139). The lab thus becomes a 
space, a context where people and apes do things together, take walks in the forest, 
and cook meals, where they form a group and learn things together. In this context, 
Segerdahl notes, the practice of eating together does not mark a difference between 
the human and the animal, as they in fact share meals together.  
 
The apes learn to communicate via symbols on a board (as they can’t speak only 
make noises and communicate through signs) and learn to ask questions and 
communicate things in their surroundings. Segerdahl notes that the laboratory seems 
to be a place where “the humans seemed to be subjects of the experiment as much as 
the apes” (Segerdahl 2014: 138). Segerdahl further describes how he at first enters 
the lab from the vantage point of “an anthropologist”, how he goes in as an observer, 
“secure in his form of humanity” expecting to see what it could mean that we teach 
them. What he didn’t expect was the existence of an ape-human context and what it 
would mean to be addressed as a person within this ape-human morality31. His 
experience visiting the lab and encountering the apes, came to have a philosophical 
impact on him. This is how he describes what happened when he entered the lab: 
 
What I didn’t expect was that the apes would make eloquent demands on me. When I 
small-talked with a caretaker outside Panbanisha’s enclosure, disobeying the instruction 
I recently was given to “sit quietly and observe”, the bonobo inside looked troubled and 
said on her keyboard – quiet! I shivered and felt shame. When I later touched her baby 
Nathan’s hand, she ran up to me and called me a monster. The language that I thought I 
should observe safely on the other side of the divide instead hit me in the face and I felt 
metaphysical vertigo. The safe-guarding contrast that initially shaped my visit was 
down for the count. My first response to Panbanisha’s rebukes was shame, because I 
was caught in the act of doing wrong. My shame instantly turned into metaphysical 
vertigo, for it unveiled the presence of someone who saw me and scrutinized my 
conduct: precisely what my manner of visiting the laboratory excluded. The vertigo 
could be described as speechlessness, for the language that I had at my disposal when I 
                                                
31 This description could be read as an example of how Segerdahl assumes the subject/object 
standpoint of humanism when entering the lab, but in fact experiences the kind of ‘flat ontology’ that 
post-humanists are calling for. 
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went to OBSERVE APES was disrupted by my meeting with Panbanisha. Or that is 
what I want to say. Panbanisha extended her moral notions to me. She talked to me and 
tried to improve me. And I felt the demand to become who she made me, above all in 
her presence. The wire between us no longer protected my all-too-human understanding 
of my visit to the laboratory (Segerdahl 2014: 140-141). 
 
 
Now, how are we to understand what is going on here? Isn’t Segerdahl’s description 
only an expression of the humanist prejudice that man is the maker of all meaning, 
and an example of the hierarchical and violent relation between humans and 
animals? It is a laboratory after all, and surely the apes were there as a part of an 
experiment. Primatologist Frans de Waal thinks of the research in this lab in these 
terms. He describes it as a “thoroughly anthropocentric enterprise” where “a 
communication system for which evolution has specifically hardwired us … is being 
imposed on another creature to see how far it can go” (de Waal quoted in Segerdahl 
2012: 27). This would be MacCormack’s position too. But perhaps there is 
something we can learn from this example, something of political, philosophical and 
moral significance. Segerdahl acknowledges the objections that can be made against 
the undoing of the contrast or difference that seems implicit in Diamond’s and 
explicit in MacCormack’s accounts, regarding the human/animal. He writes: “it 
might be objected that Panbanisha, through being enculturated, mirrored the 
language I thought was disrupted. Wasn’t the meeting made possible by language 
that originally was formed by humans who produced themselves as other than 
animals?” (Segerdahl 2014: 144). 
 
Segerdahl is thus aware of the criticism that MacCormack, Derrida, de Waal, and 
others express in their work, but for him it is not an epistemological standpoint that 
is valid in all cases. He acknowledges the criticism, the perspective and the question 
of power, but he also takes another look at the example, and situates himself and 
Panbanisha as active agents in the encounter. Segerdahl writes: 
 
But did I meet an animal? Did an ape rebuke me? It is true that Panbanisha was an 
animal in the child’s language and an exemplar of Pan paniscus in the scientific sense, 
but wasn’t her animality too impure, didn’t she reflect too much of my humanity, to 
motivate a claim that the contrast (moral contrast between humans and animals) was 
unmade? What is significant is that I met Panbanisha. Meeting her made me incapable 
of using the language of these purifying demands, which conforms to the notion that 
WE succeeded in teaching THEM. Her enculturation was no impurity, unless we insist 
on forms of language that I lost in her home (2014: 147-148, emphasis in original). 
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Segerdahl here is emphasizing a personal dimension, both regarding his experience 
and Panbanisha’s. He is being addressed by Panbanisha. She makes him feel shame. 
This encounter seems to undo any strict division between human and non-human as 
being based on language and morality, as it is usually thought of it. It also seems to 
be an example of the kind of flat ontology that many post-humanist and new 
materialists speak of. Panbanisha talks to Segerdahl, demands something of him, and 
it is something he cannot ignore. He is ashamed by his behavior and for being told 
(by an animal) to be quiet. A moral vocabulary is used in the description of what 
makes this encounter meaningful, not a theoretical idea of what the human and the 
non-human means and must mean, or what the encounter can or cannot be an 
example of. Or rather, the meaning that the example has for Segerdahl is based on 
his experience of the encounter, of what the animal says to him, rather than on a 
beforehand-decided perspective of what the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human’ must 
mean, or what human/animal encounters amounts to.  
 
If we think about the example through Karen Barad’s statement “The differential 
constitution of the “human” (“non-human”), is always accompanied by particular 
exclusions and always open to contestation” (Barad 2008: 142), what sense does it 
make to apply this to Segerdahl’s example? Does it even make sense to talk about 
there being something like the differential constitution of the human and the non-
human, and if so, what does it add to Segerdahl’s example, other than pointing to the 
fact that we can here speak of an encounter between a human and an animal? The 
encounter can be theorized via Barad’s sentence here, and it is in some ways a good 
example of how the human/non-human distinction starts to glide, or is indeed not a 
priori defined, nor an end product. But what Barad’s sentence does not capture is the 
moral existential dimension of the example, nor the moral-existential dimension of 
the entire problematic or theme of the human and the non-human.  
 
Cora Diamond writes: “The ways in which we mark what human life is belong to the 
source of moral life” (Diamond 1978: 471). Diamond points here to the internal 
relation between human life and morality and can be read as saying that what makes 
human life different from other forms of life, is its morality. But again, what does 
‘human life’ mean here? I would say it makes sense to talk about a realm of human 
meaning and of our understanding of human lives as having a moral dimension only 
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if we let go of the idea that speaking of humans or human life in this way must entail 
a process of exclusion, that this involves, per necessity, some kind of contrast, or 
hierarchy, or act of unacknowledged self-reflection, or meaning making practices of 
a discourse structured by difference. But it does not mean that the different meanings 
words such as ‘human’ and expressions like ‘human life’ can take, are not ‘open to 
contestation’. Meanings, concepts and circumstances in which we make sense of 
things change, sometimes spontaneously, unprovoked, and sometimes as an effect of 
major efforts. This aspect of language being fluid, in a sense, does not equal saying 
that meaning in general is always open to contestation. There are situations in which 
it is of equal importance to claim that something is not ‘fluid’, saying ‘no, this is 
how I mean it’, where what you say is not contestable. To claim that meaning is 
always open to contestation, as a theoretical idea, becomes a picture, a way of 
thinking that holds us captive.  
 
This does not mean that the sentence ‘meaning is always open to contestation’ 
wouldn’t be useful, applicable or make sense. As Martin Gustafsson notes in his 
article “Notes on life and human nature” (2015), “the open-ended variability of 
human languages and cultures” is astonishing and holds an “open-ended variety of 
possibilities” (2015: 67-96). However, this open-endedness also doesn’t mean that 
anything goes. Gustafsson discusses Wittgenstein’s remarks on language use as 
games, and reminds us that Wittgenstein too held that although the concept of a 
game is open-ended, it doesn’t mean that anything can count as a game. As a 
theoretical idea about meaning and language, the use of concepts, and the historicity 
of meaning, “meaning is always open to contestation”, is attractive. But it is exactly 
an example the kind of craving for generality Wittgenstein speaks of. 
 
In his discussion of the human and the animal, Segerdahl notes that seeing animals 
as fellow-beings (Diamond), or companion species (Haraway) also means perceiving 
them through notions like friendship (Segerdahl 2014: 135). Friendship is one of the 
concepts Segerdahl uses to describe the ape-human community he visited. The 
culture in the lab, he writes (trips in the forest, cooking, daily activities, playing 
games, joking), formed a community, where the difference between us and them was 
not the difference between humans and the animals, but involved ‘us’ in the ape-
human community and ‘them’, as visitors, forming the outside. In the language of 
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Karen Barad and others emphasizing that agency is not only something belonging to 
the human subject alone, in this encounter, the bonobo Panbanisha and philosopher 
Segerdahl both “constitute meaning”. Their encounter makes sense within the 
context of a shared human-ape culture that has developed in ape language research. 
Here one can speak of a post-human ethics, in the way Rosi Braidotti does, one that 
“rests on an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the 
non-human or “earth” others” (Braidotti 2014: 243). 
 
What the example above shows is that we can make distinctions between the human 
and the non-human, we can talk about humans and animals in different ways, but it 
becomes difficult to maintain a conceptual distinction that is relevant in all cases. 
One must, as Wittgenstein says, look and see, as “the language we speak is 
contingent on the circumstances of our lives” (Hertzberg 2011: 351). Lars Hertzberg 
points out that the relations between the concepts we use and the world we live in is 
as varied as life itself, and that: “in order to get a clear view of human concepts we 
must be open to that variety” (2011: 353). In these remarks, I find a sense of 
openness towards matter and meaning that the post-structuralist theorization of 
language and power seeks to address, but often fails to achieve, due to its own 
philosophical commitments. There is an emphasis on forms of life (another 
Wittgensteinian term) that are internally related to the meanings of our concepts, but 
there is also openness towards change, as the meaning and use are not determined, 
defined by or an effect of a linguistic system, discourse or any other external factor. 
In Segerdahl’s account, the idea that language and morality are constitutive notions 
for our understanding of humans and human life can be understood in two different 
ways. Language and morality as constitutive for understanding human life, can be 
taken as the point of departure for any kind of investigation or inquiry of meaning on 
the one hand, while on the other, it can as a philosophical idea be disrupted, as it is 
in his experience, encounter and engagement with an ape. It is not disrupted by a 
theory, an abstract idea or generalized view of what morality, language or meaning 
is.  
 
In conclusion what I want to say with regards to the philosophical relevance of this 
example is that the experience of ‘metaphysical vertigo’ of the undoing of the human 
sense of self that Segerdahl describes, becomes impossible within the post-humanist 
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ethical framework provided by MacCormack. She claims that the only thing that can 
be done is to deconstruct the notion of the human, (though it is unclear how to do 
that) but that we should not, may not, engage with animals, and what cannot be done 
is to think that encountering animals can have any philosophical relevance. Similar 
to de Waal, she writes: “Any sympathetic argument about what interactions we may 
have or share with nonhumans is always limited to our thinking the encounter” 
(2012: 58). In a sense, she is right, it is up to us to think about what ideas make or do 
not make sense, when thinking about these encounters. But her emphasis on limits 
(that thinking about these examples is always limited) expresses the craving for 
generality, a suspicion of meaning, and becomes what Wittgenstein calls a picture 
holding us captive. For I would say, following Wittgenstein, that the example of an 
ape rebuking a philosopher in a laboratory shows that experiences and notions of 
both the personal and of moral meaning (or power, violence, and differences) gain 
their meaning in the life we share with others, where it makes sense to give an 
account of how language comes to have a place in our lives, but where the notion of 
language (or morality), indeed no longer belongs to the human subject alone.  
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A central feature of my discussion has concerned the contrast between the theoretical 
framework of Butler, Barad, Chen and MacCormack and their focus on language and 
power and a matter of difference, and Wittgenstein’s approach to language and 
philosophical understanding. Through emphasizing this contrast I have aimed to 
show how Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and critique of philosophy, and 
his philosophical ‘method’ that encourages us to ‘look and see’ at language use in its 
multiplicity and open-endedness, constitutes a radical alternative to current feminist 
practices of critique and criticism. It offers a perspective, I argue, where we need to 
do the hard work of critique, and where our attitude towards language and life 
matter.  
 
To place the justification of politics in a theoretical understanding of language and 
meaning risks becoming the kind of metaphysical picture and justification that the 
tradition of critique wants to expose and question in the first place. It articulates 
itself as a tautology; the reason for critique is justified by the ways in which 
language and power operates, whereas critique is also what reveals this operation of 
power. The reason for thinking about language and concepts in this way is ‘justified’ 
by referring to the political. These are presuppositions that have become “epistemic 
habits” as they function as pictures of how things must be.  
 
Critique as an attitude and form of cultural understanding, I argue, must thus be 
characterized by a constitutive openness in our attitude to language and meaning, 
rather than as generalizing theses about meaning and language. Critical thinking in 
this understanding is a perspective that is rooted in our forms of life with each other, 
rather than in metaphysical abstract speculation about ‘the subject’ and its ‘others’. It 
is radical in the sense that it allows us to approach and understand questions of 
meaning, both epistemological and ethical, anew. It allows us to dissolve the 
epistemic habits of the philosophical tradition that keeps us circulating in tautologies 
and theoretical impasses, as well as helping to make sense of the kind of questions 
that feminist and post-humanist concerns express.  
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I have argued that the moral dimension and the questions of moral concern addressed 
by feminist posthumanist ethics are not primarily questions of justice, rights or the 
use of this or that concept of identity (human, non-human, man, woman, brown, 
white, gay, Finnish, secular, Christian), but of meaning in a broader sense (Gaita 
2006). A theoretical idea or ‘picture’ that I have discussed in relation to ethics, is the 
one where moral meaning or ethics is discussed or defined a priori, in the abstract, 
independent of the situations we are faced with in our lives, or independent of the 
examples we are working with when we are doing theory or philosophy. The 
contrast I have highlighted in this discussion is the difference between locating 
moral meaning in an outside, abstract realm or theory and in locating it inside the 
lives we share with each other and with the non-human.  
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Denna pro gradu avhandling diskuterar frågor som är centrala inom den feministiska 
posthumanistiska teorin. Detta teoriintensiva forskningsfält karakteriseras av ett 
kritiskt förhållningssätt till humanismens arv som en kulturell, politisk, filosofisk 
och akademisk tanketradition. I denna avhandling granskar jag hur frågan om det 
mänskliga och distinktionen människa/djur förstås inom feministisk posthumanistisk 
teori och analyserar dessa med hjälp av Ludvig Wittgensteins språkfilosofiska 
iakttagelser. Jag diskuterar fyra exempel ur den samtida feministiska teorin: 1) Judith 
Butlers teoretisering kring det mänskliga i boken Undoing Gender (2004), 2) Karen 
Barads vidareutveckling av det för Butler centrala begreppet performativitet i 
artikeln “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
Comes to Matter” (2003), 3) Mel Y. Chens bok Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial 
Mattering and Queer Affect (2012) i vilken Chen argumenterar för existensen av en 
kulturell hierarkisering baserad på grader av livlighet, samt 4) Patricia MacCormacks 
bok Posthumanist Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory (2012) där hon talar för 
en abolitionistisk ståndpunkt gällande våra relationer till djur.  
 
Alla dessa exempel tar på ett sätt eller annat upp frågan om hur det mänskliga och 
det omänskliga eller det icke mänskliga begripliggörs och ges mening i vår kultur. 
Butler, Barad, Chen och MacCormack är alla tänkare inom den feministiska 
teoribildningen som är starkt influerade av den poststrukturalistiska 
tanketraditionens filosofer. Den posthumanistiska ansatsen till att decentrera det 
humanistiska subjektet, att visa på en kontinuitet mellan vetenskapernas 
självförståelse, praktiker och politiska och etiska frågor är en välkommen utveckling 
inom humanvetenskaperna och framför allt ansatserna till att utveckla allt mera 
tvärdisciplinära forskningsprojekt bör ses som fruktbara. Det är likaså välkommet att 
man börjat uppmärksammat det icke-mänskligas roll i en posthumanistisk anda. Det 
finns ändå skäl att fråga vad det är som står på spel i dessa diskussioner och 
förskjutningar i debatter. I avhandlingen ställer jag därför frågan vad det är som 
posthumanismen tillför. Är det något annat än ett perspektivskifte, och i så fall vad? 
Vad innebär detta perspektivskifte för den feministiska teorin och filosofin och vad 
innebär det för en kritisk politisk filosofi?  
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Avhandlingen diskuterar därmed den feministiska posthumanistiska teorins politiska 
och kritiska ansatser och även hur vi skall förstå de moraliska dimensionerna av den 
feministiska posthumanismen. Avhandlingens sista kapitel diskuterar ett exempel ur 
den svenska filosofen Pär Segerdals forskning, där han möter en apa i ett 
laboratorium där forskare bedriver ett projekt om språkinlärning hos apor. Segerdahl 
beskriver hur han blir tillrättavisad av en apa då han bryter mot de anvisningar han 
fått av en av skötarna, och hur denna erfarenhet av mötet med apan kommer att 
upplösa vissa filosofiska ”bilder” som har präglat hans tänkande. Jag diskuterar detta 
exempel för att belysa ett kontrasterande filosofiskt förståelsesätt av ”det mänskliga” 
och distinktionen ”djur/människa” som utmanar många av den posthumanistiska 
feministiska teorins invanda tankemönster.  
!
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Den feministiska posthumanistiska teorin har särskilt kommit att beteckna ett 
nyväckt intresse för ”tillblivandets processer” och ”materiellt-semiotiska” 
förhållningssätt till de fenomen som studeras. Posthumanism betyder i detta 
sammanhang en betoning av ontologiska frågor, inte att förväxla med materialism i 
en marxistisk vokabulär. Denna vändning mot det ontologiska bör förstås som en 
reaktion mot tidigare rådande paradigm inom humaniora och kulturforskningen 
överlag, som primärt diskuterat kulturella fenomen som en fråga om språk och 
betydelser. Ansatserna har framförallt varit att historisera olika frågor och fenomen 
(till exempel kön, sexualitet, emotioner) som en effekt av språk, betydelsesystem och 
diskursteorier. Denna ”språkliga vändning” influerad av tänkare som Jacques 
Derrida och Michel Foucault synliggjorde kopplingar mellan makt och kunskap, och 
kom därmed (enligt kritikerna) att utesluta frågor om sakers natur, materialitet, kort 
sagt: verkligheten och konkreta förhållanden.  
 
Posthumanismen kunde karakteriseras som en vidareutveckling av den tanketradition 
som skapats av den kritiska teorin och feministisk, postkolonial och 
poststrukturalistisk forskning, vilket även är det intellektuella arv som den 
akademiska feminismen på sätt eller annat förhåller sig till. Den röda tråden utgörs 
av att man vill politisera den akademiska forskningen, vilket aktualiserar frågan om 
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relationen mellan teori och politik och i synnerhet hur man tänker sig att ett 
teoretiskt tänkande kan förändra våra förhållningssätt till världen. En central aspekt 
av posthumanistiska angreppssätt är att inte a priori anta eller skapa motsatser mellan 
natur och kultur, människa och djur och så vidare. Fokus är på uppluckringen av 
hierarkiska dikotomier, skillnadstänkande (man/kvinna, subjekt/ objekt, 
människa/djur, natur/kultur) och ett ifrågasättande av människan som ett självklart 
centrum för vetande, kunnande och för världen i allmänhet. Detta tankesätt präglar 
även Karen Barads, Judith Butlers, Mel Y Chens och Patricia MacCormacks 
tänkande, i vilka de beskriver hur saker och ting blir till genom både språkliga, 
historiska, lokala och globala maktrelationer men också genom specifika biologiska 
och materiella villkor.  
 
Den första delen av avhandlingen introducerar och beskriver den filosofiska och 
idéhistoriska bakgrunden till posthumanismens centrala teoretiska anspråk. Därefter 
introducerar jag de centrala aspekterna av Ludvig Wittgensteins filosofi som 
diskuteras i avhandlingen. Dessa berör framförallt hans kritik av filosofers tendenser 
till generaliserande förklaringar och tendensen till att förakta det han kallar de 
enskilda fallen. Jag diskuterar även hur han beskriver filosofer som varande ”fångna 
av bilder” och hur det filosofiska arbetet måste utgå ifrån att se efter och granska hur 
vi de facto använder språket. I relation till Wittgensteins filosofi och inspirerad av 
hans kritiska anmärkningar, använder jag uttrycket epistemiska vanor (”epistemic 
habits”) för att synliggöra hur de tänkare jag diskuterar på olika sätt fastnat i ”bilder” 
som håller dem fångna i vissa tankesätt. Dessa är framförallt olika förståelser av hur 
språket fungerar, hur språkanvändning alltid ses som en fråga om ett 
skillnadskapande och hierarkisering av betydelser.  I denna del av diskussionen tar 
jag upp hur de olika tänkarna förstår språk, mening, politik och etik.  
 
Judith Butler skriver t.ex. att det mänskliga alltid bestäms utifrån dess historiska 
bestämning, hur begreppet människa alltid handlar om normer och maktrelationer. 
Samtidigt påstår hon att begreppets framtid är ”öppen” och att dess betydelser inte är 
på förhand givna. Med hänvisning till den teoritradition som Butlers tänkande utgår 
ifrån, som diskuteras i del två, visar jag hur Butler är fångad i en bild av språket 
influerad av Jacques Derrida och en maktförståelse influerad av Michel Foucault. 
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Jag visar på en spänning och paradox i Butlers tänkande och hur frågan om att språk 
alltid handlar om makt genomsyrar hennes tänkande.  
 
I min diskussion av Karen Barads vidareutveckling av Butlers tänkande, visar jag 
hur Barad, trots sin kritik av Butler även hon är fångad i samma bild av språket som 
skillnadskapande och hierarkiserande. Även Barad hävdar att det mänskliga och det 
icke-mänskliga alltid görs begripligt igenom en skillnad som är hierarkisk. Samtidigt 
vill Barad också hävda att det finns en öppenhet i språket. Hos Butler och Barad är 
alltså slutsatsen den att mening skapas för att vi kan göra kontraster (skillnad ses 
som orsaken till mening), dessa kontraster är alltid en effekt av makt, betydelser och 
språklig mening är alltid ”öppet” och därmed aldrig ”låst”. Jag kritiserar denna bild 
och dessa slutsatser för att bestå i ett missförstånd av vad språklig mening handlar 
om, igenom att påpeka att det blir obegripligt hur ett kritisk tänkande eller en kritisk 
filosofi överhuvudtaget är möjligt, om inte vi kan göra en skillnad mellan språkliga 
uttryck som inte är en följd av makt, och dessa som är det. 
 
I det tredje kapitlet diskuterar jag Mel Y Chens teoretisering kring hur grader av 
levande och icke levande visar sig i vår kultur. Chen diskuterar bl.a. frågor om 
vardagsspråket och ger exempel som ”jag vill inte vara en grönsak”, ”jag vill inte 
vara en sten”, ”att bli behandlad som en hund”. Dessa är alla exempel på en 
hierarkisering mellan dött (stenar) och levande (människor och djur). Inom denna 
skala finns det gradskillnader menar Chen, som bland annat påstår att meningen ”jag 
vill inte vara en sten” är obegriplig eller ambivalent eftersom den i lingvistiken ges 
en asterisk för att markera obegriplighet. Vad Chen förbiser, och som jag påpekar i 
avhandlingen med hänvisning till Wittgensteins språkfilosofi, är att denna sats kan 
vara fullt begriplig då vi ser på den och dess användning i ett mänskligt liv. Vi kan 
tänka oss ett barn som talar med sina föräldrar om vilka roller som finns för ett 
teaterstycke som skall spelas under skolans julfest, och att barnet säger ”jag vill inte 
vara en sten” som ett uttryck för en önskan om att få spela en annan roll i pjäsen. 
Ytterligare diskuterar jag Chens kritik av J.L. Austins användning av ord apa i hans 
filosofiska verk där han diskuterar språkets performativa aspekter. Chen påstår att 
Austins val av ordet apa är ett uttryck för en kolonialistisk och rasistisk maktordning 
och att detta visar på den rasism som ligger till grund för den kritiska teori som 
utvecklats i diskussioner kring performativitet. Jag ifrågasätter Chens anspråk och 
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drar slutsatsen att det enbart är begripligt att konstatera att användningen av ord som 
apa är problematiskt för att det har rasistiska undertoner, om vi redan på förhand har 
bestämt oss att varje fall och användning av ordet apa är problematiskt p.g.a. dess 
rasistiska undertoner. Jag lyfter fram att vi måste kunna dra en skillnad mellan icke 
rasistiska och rasistiska användningar för att överhuvudtaget kunna bedriva en 
kritisk filosofi, visa på politiska betydelser av språkanvändning och moraliska 
dimensioner av våra delade liv med varandra.  
  
I det fjärde kapitlet diskuterar jag hur bilden om språk och makt som varande 
skillnadskapande dras till sin spets hos Patricia MacCormack då hon i sin bok 
Posthumanist Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory (2012) hävdar att vi bör ge 
upp tanken på att överhuvudtaget filosofera om djur. Jag visar i min diskussion att 
hennes kritiska tankesätt är förankrad i en förvirrad bild av språket och en förvirrad 
bild av vad det innebär att vi lever liv i vilka djur ingår. MacCormack är ett exempel 
på hur den epistemiska vanan att alltid se vissa begrepp som uttryck för makt gör en 
blind för den mångfald av betydelser som begrepp och människor och djur kan ha i 
våra liv.  
 
Mångfalden av respons, tänkande och språkanvändning i våra liv är temat hos de 
filosofer som utgör min diskussionspartner i avhandlingens sista och avslutande 
kapitel. Jag tar upp Cora Diamond och Pär Segerdahls diskussioner om distinktionen 
djur/människa och hur denna är grundläggande för vårt begrepp om ett mänskligt liv. 
Cora Diamond skriver i sin artikel ”Att äta kött och att äta människor” att det finns 
en skillnad mellan djur och människa som är grundläggande för hur vi förstår vad ett 
mänskligt liv är. Segerdahl vidareutvecklar Diamonds exempel där hon skriver att vi 
lär oss vad en människa är bland annat igenom att vi sitter vid ett bord där vi äter 
dem, vi sitter runt bordet medan de är på det” (Diamond 1978). Segerdal diskuterar 
ett motexempel där apor och deras skötare som äter tillsammans. Segerdahls poäng 
är att visa på att trots att det finns skillnader som vi kan göra mellan människa och 
djur, finns det inte en skillnad som vi kan dra en gång för alla och som gäller i alla 
fall.. Detta är även Diamonds poäng. Segerdal visar därmed på relationen mellan det 
begreppsliga och det empiriska, och hur erfarenheter (i detta fall, hans egen 
erfarenhet av att blivit tillrättavisad av en apa) kan utmana invanda filosofiska 
tankemönster. Jag diskuterar Diamond och Segerdahl som exempel på hur det 
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posthumanistiska feministiska tänkandets fokus på politiska och etiska frågor, inte 
behöver innebära en teoretisk förståelse av hur makt och skillnader skapas i språket 
och därmed får ett uttryck i våra liv, utan visar på hur de är ett radikalt alternativ till 
existerande tankesätt inom den traditionen. 
 
Segerdahls exempel visar också att de föreställningar som ofta förstås som 
riktgivande för hur vi tänker kring människor och djur (att människor kan språk, som 
djur inte kan och att människor har en moral, som djur inte har) utmanas då vi ser på 
fall som på språkinlärningen hos apor. I detta exempel utgör djur och människor 
kontexten för samhörigheten, de kommunicerar med varandra, de delar ett språk och 
de delar en moral: Segerdahl blir tillrättavisad av en apa. I detta fall är det svårt att 
applicera MacCormacks ståndpunkt om att allt engagemang med djur är ett uttryckt 
för antropocentrism, utan att avvisa det moraliska krav som apan ställer på en.  
 
I avhandlingen visar jag alltså hur en kritisk och politisk feministisk posthumanistisk 
teori måste ge upp vissa invanda tankemönster (epistemiska vanor) och upplösa 
tanken om att språkanvändning alltid ingår i maktrelationer, att begreppsanvändning 
alltid handlar om skillnadskapande praktiker och att teori alltid handlar om politik. 
Jag avslutar min sammanfattning med hänvisning till Toril Moi (2009) då hon säger 
att det som är nödvändigt för att överhuvudtaget kunna skapa visioner av en 
annorlunda feministisk teori, är upplösandet av det starka grepp som den 
poststrukturalistiska språkteorin haft kring feminismen. I denna avhandling har jag 
visat på hur ett sådant upplösande kan se ut.  
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